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thority to regulate harmful substances that flowed through that channet.
Pursuant to the court's findings, the court ordered partial summary
judgment for the United States on the claim that Thorson violated the
CWA. The court denied the United States' motion for partial summary
judgment against Construction Management for lack of evidence. The
court further dismissed Thorson's counterclaim for declaratory judgment.
Suzanne Knowle
STATE COURTS
CALIFORNIA
Acosta v. Big Bear Cmty. Servs. Dist., No. E033363, 2004 Cal. App.
LEXIS 2253 (Cal. Ct. App. March 10, 2004) (holding the exaction of
groundwater rights in exchange for extending water services was not a
regulatory taking).
Andy Acosta appealed the dismissal by the Superior Court of San
Bernadino County of his claim that the exaction of water rights in exchange for the extension of water services to his property was a regulatory taking. Acosta obtained a conditional use permit ("CUP") from
San Bernadino County allowing him to construct two buildings to use
for recycling and storage for a wood-chipping and stockpiling business.
The CUP imposed several conditions including the requirements that
Acosta install three fire hydrants on his property and procure any water
needs from Big Bear Community Services District ("District").
The District agreed to extend a water main on Acosta's property
for fire hydrant purposes and provide water services so long as Acosta
conveyed his groundwater rights on the property to the District.
Acosta argued the conditional taking of water rights from the property
was a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. He filed for a writ of mandate or an administrative
mandamus to compel the District to extend a water main on his property without requiring a conveyance of his groundwater rights. The
trial court dismissed Acosta's writ and Acosta appealed to the Court of
Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two.
The court first addressed the ripeness of Acosta's claim. The District argued because the CUP denied Acosta the right to use water extracted from wells on his property, there was no controversy and
Acosta's case was, therefore, not ripe. However, while the CUP required Acosta to procure his water from the District thus making his
water right useless, at the time Acosta brought this action, the CUP was
no longer binding. Therefore, because Acosta possessed the right to
access his water right, there was a controversy and the case was ripe for
consideration.
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Additionally, the court determined Acosta's case was not moot. A
case is moot when a court cannot grant a plaintiff effective relief. The
court could have reversed the trial court's dismissal. In doing so,
Acosta would receive an extension of the water main without being
required to convey his water rights, which would result in effective relief. In addition, a case is not moot when the case presents an issue of
broad public interest that is likely to recur, or when a recurrence of the
issue between the two parties is possible. The court determined other
property owners may wish to obtain water services from the District
without conveying their water rights. Additionally, the issue would
likely arise again if Acosta reapplied for a CUP. Therefore, because the
court could grant effective relief, the issue was likely to recur, and a
recurrence of the issue between Acosta and the District was possible,
the case was not moot.
The court next addressed whether the District retained the authority to compel the conveyance of water rights. The District derived its
power from statute. Government Code authorized the District to supply water services and acquire real property. The District also had the
authority to perform acts to achieve those purposes. Additionally, the
Water Code authorized the District to declare a water emergency and
thereafter adopt measures to conserve the water supply for the greatest
public benefit. Therefore, because the District declared a water emergency, the District had the authority to adopt reasonable measures to
protect the District's water supply. The court deemed that conditioning the grant of water services upon the granting of water rights was a
reasonable measure to protect the District's water supply. As a result,
state statute authorized the District to compel the conveyance of water
rights when granting new water services.
The court then determined whether the exaction of water rights
was a taking requiring just compensation. A land use regulation sometimes constitutes a taking. A land use regulation is a regulation that
impairs a landowner's interest in the free use of his land. A taking requires just compensation. The county-issued CUP contained a landuse regulation by requiring the installation of fire hydrants. The District, however issued no part of the CUP. The District only conditioned the granting of services upon the conveyance of water rights.
Conditioning the granting of services on the conveyance of water
rights was not a land use regulation. Therefore, Acosta was not entitled to just compensation from the District based on a land use regulation.
However, under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the
government cannot require a landowner to convey a property right for
public use in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to
the property. Courts apply the doctrine to determine if a regulatory
taking has occurred. To determine whether an unconstitutional con-
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dition exists, courts must consider if the condition advances a legitimate state interest and whether the condition deprives a landowner of
economically viable use of his land. Then a court must ascertain
whether an "essential nexus" exists between the state interest and the
condition. The "essential nexus" must be a reasonable relationship
between the two. If the court determines the nexus exists, it must then
ensure the condition is reasonably proportional to the interest the
state will achieve. The condition may be considered a taking if the
court does not find proportionality between the condition and the
state interest. History indicated Northern California experienced a
water shortage for fifteen years prior to Acosta's writ. The District provided water throughout this drought and continued to do so after.
The District needed to regulate water consumption and prevent depletion of the source of its water in order to continue providing water services. The court decreed this to be a legitimate state interest.
The court determined the required water rights conveyance
formed a reasonable nexus to the District's need to regulate and preserve the local water supply. That requirement was also roughly proportional to the needs of the District to regulate and preserve the water
supply. As a result, the exaction of water rights in exchange for the
supplying of water services did not constitute an unconstitutional condition. Therefore, the court held that it was not a regulatory taking
requiring compensation.
Finally, the court determined whether a mandate or judicial review
of ministerial or legislative acts was proper. Mandate is proper to correct the exercise of discretionary legislative power, but only if the action taken is fraudulent or so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to
reveal an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.
Because the exaction of water rights from Acosta did not constitute
a regulatory taking and the state exacted the water rights to further a
legitimate state interest, it was not fraudulent, or unreasonable and
arbitrary. Therefore, a writ of mandate for Acosta was not proper.
As a result, the court affirmed the trial courts dismissal and
awarded the District costs for appeal.
Sean T. Olson
Chino Land & Water Co. v. Lewis Investment Co., E033614, 2004 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 2023 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2004) (holding a failure to allege a cognizable water right under any of the three classified
California groundwater rights precluded a water company from
amending its complaint for quiet tide, declaratory relief, and injunctive
relief).
Chino Land & Water Co. ("Chino") appealed a judgment in favor
of Lewis Investment Co. ("Lewis") after the Superior Court of San Bernardino County sustained Lewis' demurrer to Chino's complaint for
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quiet title, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief, without permitting
Chino leave to amend.
Pursuant to a 1908 reservation of rights, Chino alleged ownership
of groundwater rights and related easements to the Lewis property.
Chino further alleged Lewis only had the right to use the groundwater
on the property itself and solely for agricultural purposes. Chino
claimed possession of the right to lay and maintain pipes and aqueducts on the land. In addition, Chino claimed the right to use all
available water pumped from the property and to sell or lease the water. Last, Chino alleged Lewis proposed to increase water use resulting
from further development of the property.
California classifies groundwater rights by three types: overlying,
appropriative, and prescriptive. The property owner's right to take
groundwater for use on the land within the basin or watershed characterizes an overlying right. The appropriative right depends on the actual taking of water. When a wrongful taking of water occurs, an appropriative right may ripen into a prescriptive right.
The California Court of Appeals held that Chino did not possess a
water right recognized by California law. First, Chino could not possess an overlying right because Chino did not own the property. Second, Chino could not possess an appropriative or prescriptive right
because neither Chino nor its predecessors ever took the water and
applied it to beneficial use.
Since Chino could not claim a present interest in the property
owned by Lewis, a quiet title cause of action could not exist. The court
held that a complaint seeking declaratory relief required the existence
of an actual controversy and none existed in this case. Further, injunctive relief is a remedy requiring an underlying cause of action. Chino
provided no adequate explanation for amending its complaint to state
a cause of action and, therefore, the court held the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in sustaining Lewis' demurrer to Chino's complaint.
Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Chino
a quiet title action, declaratory relief, or injunctive relief based on
Chino's lack of a cognizable water right. The court further ordered
Chino to pay Lewis' appeal costs.
Kevin Lazar
City of Huntington Beach v. Orange County Water Dist., No. G029778,
1600 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2004)
2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LIS
(holding Orange County Water District's master plan report and capital improvement program do not fall within the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act, and therefore, do not require an
environmental impact report or an initial study).
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Orange County Water District ("OCWD") manages and controls
water, including basin groundwater, for most of the northern half of
Orange County. In 1986, OCWD adopted a policy allowing its longterm producers to annex territories within the Santa Ana River watershed and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
("MWD"). In 1996, however, the state proposed the reorganization of
water districts, placing annexation opportunities for OCWD producers
injeopardy. OCWD put a temporary moratorium on annexations until
they identified the implications of the reorganization.
OCWD developed a master plan report ("Report") to identify longterm needs for water production and to determine OCWD's ability to
meet those needs. The Report recognized anticipated growth of water
demands, both within the existing boundaries and after potential annexation. Further, the Report suggested possible capital improvement
projects to help meet future demands while keeping costs steady. Since
the Report constituted an informational planning strategy and not a
precise plan, OCWD received and filed the Report, instead of initiating
the formal approval or adoption process. Shortly after filing the Report, OCWD adopted a five-year Capital Improvement Program
("CIP"), subject to further review, outlining the benefits of those potential projects. In light of their tentative plan for the future, OCWD
lifted the moratorium on annexation, returning to their original policy.
The City of Huntington Beach and other interested cities ("Cities")
filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Orange
County asking the court to limit water production and to prohibit annexation until OCWD complied with the California Environmental
Quality Act ("CEQA"). The trial court summarily determined that
OCWD's filing of the Report did not constitute a project under CEQA.
Further, after trial, the court found OCWD's adoption of the CIP did
not subject them to CEQA obligations.
On appeal to the California Court of Appeals, the Cities asserted
that both the Report and the CIP constituted approved projects within
the meaning of CEQA. CEQA requires a public agency to prepare an
environmental impact report ("EIR") before approving a project resulting in a potential significant impact on the environment. The relevant inquiry to determine the application of the CEQA was whether
OCWD's planning activities fell within the relevant definition of an
approved project.
The CEQA statute defined a project as an activity that may cause a
direct physical change or a reasonably foreseeable indirect change in
the environment. Case law further narrowed the definition by requiring a project to amount to a necessary step in a chain of events culminating in an impact on the environment. The court found that the
Report and the CIP constituted a general strategy on how to reach certain goals and the adoption of this plan had no binding effect. More-
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over, the court held the Report and the CIP were not prepared pursuant to any statutory obligation and has no legal consequence for
OCWD. Further, CEQA guidelines defined approval as a decision to
commit an agency to a definite course of action. CEQA compliance
was not required where the agency's action did not constitute a proposal to carry out or approve an activity.
The Cities' argument failed on three key points. First, the Cities
contended that by lifting the moratorium on annexation, the OCWD
implemented the Report. However, the court held that lifting the
moratorium simply reinstated without change an existing annexation
policy. Second, the Cities argued that OCWD implemented the Report
when formally adopting the CIP, triggering CEQA's project requirement. The court reasoned that the CIP, a budgeting tool used to calculate potential capital projects, was not an essential step in a causal
chain resulting in an impact on the environment. Finally, the court
upheld the trial court's decision that the engineer's certification of the
Report did not equate to approval or commitment. The engineer's
statement indicated intent to prepare the necessary CEQA documents,
if OCWD wished to implement any of the capital projects in the future.
In conclusion, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding
OCWD made no commitment to a definite course of action. OCWD's
plans were non-binding, fluid, and subject to annual change. OCWD
had not indicated intent to approve a project within the meaning of
CEQA. In the future, OCWD's approval of one or both of the initiatives would trigger environmental review. However, at this point, the
CEQA did not apply.
JenniferSuh
Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 2004
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8604 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2004) (holding
in order for a water management plan approved in conjunction with
applicable state laws to be legally adequate, the plan (1) must abide by
those state laws and (2) address the sufficient reliability of water for the
future of the water district).
Friends of the Santa Clara River and others ("Friends") appealed
the denial of their petition for writ of mandate alleging that the Urban
Water Management Plan of 2000 ("UWMP") prepared by the Castaic
Lake Water Agency ("CLWA") violated California state laws requiring
water management plans to adequately assess the reliability of water
supply for the future of the water district. Public review of the UWMP
revealed much opposition to the plan, yet CLWA still approved the
UWMP. Friends challenged this approval in the Superior Court of
Kern County via a writ of mandate, which the court denied. The Court
of Appeals of California, Fifth Appellate District, reversed the decision
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and remanded the matter back to the superior court to grant the writ
of mandate and vacate CLWA's approval of the UWMP.
State law requires CLWA, as a local water district in California, to
produce a water management plan for its district. In 2000 CLWA approved the UWMP, which planned for the use of alternative water
sources should the ongoing problem of percholate contamination continue in the area. Historically, most of the water in this region came
from an underground aquifer, which suffered from increasing percholate contamination. Thus, the UWMP stipulated that if this contamination continued, CLWA would take more water from the uncontaminated part of the aquifer, as well as restore full aquifer capacity by
treating the contaminated water. The UWMP, however, contained no
alternative sources to cover the reduction in aquifer water use during
the construction of the treatment facilities.
Friends argued the UWMP was incomplete and insufficient.
Friends claimed that the UWMP failed to address the time needed to
build facilities to treat contaminated water and failed to describe the
reliability of the groundwater supply in the interim. The specific claim
was that the UWMP did not comply with state regulations because it
erroneously conflated existing sources with planned sources of water
supply by: (1) improperly characterizing merely potential sources as
planned sources already available; and (2) failing to adequately evaluate the reliability of existing water sources. CLWA claimed that all of
Friends' claims were merely challenges to the quality of evidence and
therefore outside the jurisdiction of review by the appellate court.
CLWA also claimed that any deficiency in the UWMP was not fatal to
the UWMP's approval because the UWMP required revision every five
years.
Both expert testimony and the language of the UWMP itself cited
unknown factors in the growing percholate contamination problems in
the aquifer. The UWMP recognized that: (1) several wells had already
been shut down because of contamination; (2) the contamination
spread into other sections of the aquifer; and (3) the cost of treating
already contaminated water would be extremely expensive.
The
UWMP also left out several factors required to sufficiently analyze the
future of the aquifer. Specifically, the UWMP failed to: (1) assess the
time required to implement the plan; (2) determine the growth speed
of the contamination; and (3) propose alternative water sources in the
event of widespread contamination. The UWMP also failed to address
the timeframe for an installation of facilities needed to treat contaminated water.
Based on the numerous inadequacies in the UWMP, the court determined the UWMP was fatally flawed. The court therefore reversed
the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case with orders
that the superior court grant the Friends' petition for writ of mandate.
John Lintzenich
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Haddad v. City Council of Monterey, No. H025805, 2004 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 4651 (Cal. Ct. App. May 13, 2004) (holding the city
council's decision not to pursue pueblo water rights was neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor lacking in evidentiary support).
Lou Haddad ("Haddad") urged the City of Monterey ("City") to
hold hearings to address whether the City should pursue "pueblo water
rights" ("PWR"). At the public hearing, the City Attorney recommended the City not pursue costly and time-consuming PWR litigation.
The City Council of Monterey ("Council") subsequently voted not to
pursue PWR. The majority based their vote on the unlikely success,
the cost, and the inappropriateness of pitting the City against other
jurisdictions through PWR claims. Haddad filed a writ of mandate in
California State Court claiming the Council abused its discretion. The
trial court denied the petition. On appeal, Haddad asserted that the
trial court erred in denying his petition because (1) the City had a duty
to pursue PWR; (2) Haddad had a valid declaratory relief action; and
(3) Haddad had standing to pursue PWR on his own behalf.
The Court of Appeal of California for the Sixth Appellate District
stated the separation of powers doctrine precluded the court from
compelling the Council to make a particular legislative action. Thus,
the court found it could only review an arbitrary and capricious Council decision, or a Council policy choice entirely lacking in evidentiary
support, and could not look into the wisdom or reasonableness of that
Council choice. The court found that the Council did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, nor did the Council's action entirely lack evidentiary
support. The court based this determination on the evidence before
the Council on the likely success and cost of a PWR claim, as well as the
potential for alienating neighbor jurisdictions. The court further
stated that attacking an administrative order with an action for declaratory relief was not permissible, and thus dismissed that issue. The
court also dismissed Haddad's standing issue to pursue the City's PWR
on his own behalf since Haddad's original petition did not raise the
issue. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment to
deny Haddad's petition.
D.M. Shohet
Protect Our Water v. County of Stanislaus, No. F042089, 2003 Cal.
App. LEXIS 11470 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2003) (holding the California
Environmental Quality Act required a party seeking approval of an
"addendum" to a previously certified environmental impact report to
comply with the statutory procedures, including determining whether
the addendum constituted a substantial change within the meaning of
the statute).
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Protect Our Water and others (collectively "POW') appealed a
Stanislaus County Superior Court ruling that granted the Diablo
Grande Limited Partnership's motion for summary judgment and denied POW's motion for writ of mandamus. In a 1996 proceeding, the
Court of Appeals of California, Fifth Appellate District, held the Environmental Impact Report ("EIR") for the Diablo Grande Specific Plan
("Specific Plan") that proposed a 29,500-acre destination resort and
residential community ("Project") in southwest Stanislaus County
("County") was inadequate. After that decision, the County drafted
the Diablo Grande Water Resources Plan (""rater Resources Plan")
and prepared a supplemental EIR ("SEIR") for the Project. POW then
challenged the SEIR and the superior court ruled the SEIR was deficient. The appellate court modified the superior court's ruling and
ordered the superior court to issue a modified judgment voiding both
the EIR and the SEIR. The appellate court also stated that the County
needed to prepare an SEIR consistent with the ruling and the County
could recertify a portion of the Project, provided the preparation of
the SEIR occurred prior to the partial recertification.
On December 7, 1999, while the appeal was pending, the County
set aside and voided its recertification of the Diablo Grande EIR and
SEIR. The County then recertified the Specific Plan EIR as supplemented by the Water Resources Plan SEIR. On December 11, 2001,
the County approved an addendum to the Specific Plan EIR ("Addendum") and granted a request to add Kern County Water Agency as an
additional water supply option on the Specific Plan EIR. POW filed a
petition for writ of mandate on January 10, 2002, asking the superior
court to order the County to set aside and void its approvals of the Project including the Addendum. The superior court denied POW's petition and POW appealed.
POW argued: (1) the approval of the Addendum violated the superior court's modified judgment issued July 6, 2001; and (2) the Addendum violated the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA").
The court determined the approval of the Addendum did not violate
the superior court's modified judgment because, under the CEQA, a
subsequent approval of a change to an approved project without adequate environmental review of the change does not void the prior approval of the project. Additionally, the court reviewed the California
Public Resources Code ("Code") and noted the Code required major
revisions of an EIR when a party proposed substantial ,changes for a
project. The court stated the change from one water source to another
might constitute a substantial change in the Project warranting major
revisions to the EIR. The court then referred to the Code in order to
distinguish EIR and SEIR in this case. The main difference is an EIR
was required whenever a project could result in a significant environmental effect and an SEIR only explored the environmental ramifications of a substantial change not considered in the original EIR. The

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

court viewed the Addendum as an SEIR and ruled that, in adopting the
Addendum, the County should have determined whether substantial
changes to the Project existed or had occurred.
Thus, the court reversed the holding of the superior court and directed the superior court to issue a writ of mandate ordering the
County to rescind its approval of the Addendum to the EIR. The court
also specified that its holding only applied to the manner in which the
County approved that particular Addendum, not whether an Addendum might be appropriate for the post-certification change from one
water source to another.
David W. Hall
Rincon Del Diablo Mun. Water Dist. v. San Diego County Water Auth.,
No. D042529, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6839 (Cal. Ct. App. July
21, 2004) (affirming the superior court's ruling granting summary
judgment and holding the capital portion of the San Diego Water Authority's transportation rate is not a capacity charge and even if the
transportation rate qualified as a capacity charge, the charge does not
exceed the estimated reasonable cost of providing service).
The San Diego County Water Authority ("SDCWA") provides water
service, delivering water via an aqueduct system to member agencies.
The SDCWA adopted Ordinance No. 2002-03 ("Ordinance") on June
27, 2002, which unbundled their flat fee water rate into multiple categories, one being a transportation rate based on every acre-foot of water consumed. Revenue from the transportation rate is deposited in
the SDCWA's general fund and may be used to fund capital costs.
Nonetheless, Government Code section 66013 defines a capacity
charge as a fee for new or existing facilities benefiting the person
charged and provides that capacity charges shall not exceed the estimated reasonable cost of providing the service. Five water districts located in the northeastern section of San Diego County ("Northern Districts") brought suit in the Superior Court of San Diego County to invalidate the transportation rate portion of the SDCWA's Ordinance
under Government Code section 66013. The Superior Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the SCDWA.
The Northern Districts asserted on appeal that the capital portion
of the transportation rate ("capital portion") is a capacity charge under
section 66013. Relying on the California Supreme Court's decision in
San Marcos Water District v. San Marcos Unifed School District, the Northern Districts argued that a fee for capital improvements based on anticipated water service constituted a special assessment under a "look to
the purpose test." Additionally, the Northern Districts claimed the
capital portion violates the reasonableness requirement of section
66013, because it unfairly reflects the cost of service provided.
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The California Court of Appeals first looked to the statute, but
found nothing in the language of section 66013 or its legislative history
expressing the Legislature's intention to impose a new standard on
water rates. Next, the court rejected the Northern Districts' San Marcos
argument, relying instead on its decision in Brydon v. EastBay Municipal
Utility District, holding that block water rates levied in accordance with
patterned usage and not designed for the purpose of replacing property tax monies lost as a result of the passing of California Constitution,
article XIII A ("Proposition 13"), do not constitute special assessments.
Finally, the court rejected the Northern Districts' claim that the capital
portion is unreasonable because, assuming the capital portion is a capacity charge, under the language of section 66013 a capacity charge
does not violate the statute unless it exceeds the cost of providing the
service. The Northern Districts, however, presented no evidence that
the capital portion exceeded the capital costs of building, maintaining,
or improving the aqueduct system.
Because the court concluded that the transportation rate was a
charge for the delivery of water, that there was no indication the Legislature intended to change the statutory scheme governing water rates,
and that there was no evidence that the capital portion exceeds the
capital costs of the aqueduct, it affirmed the lower court's judgment.
Charles P. Kersch, Jr.
Sec. Nat'l Guar., Inc. v. Monterey Peninsula Water Mgmt. Dist., No.
H024969, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 12230 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003)
(holding the water management district did not deprive a water rights
holder of senior water rights in denying a water distribution permit to
the water rights holder where water management district followed
proper procedures).
In 1998 Security National Guaranty, Inc. ("SNG") obtained approval to construct a resort project on its beachfront property in Sand
City under condition that SNG obtain a water distribution permit from
the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District ("District"). Pursuant to this arrangement, SNG applied to the District for the permit
and the District subsequently denied SNG's request. Following this
denial, SNG petitioned the Monterey County Superior Court for a writ
of mandate directing the District to grant the petition. The superior
court granted the District's demurrer without leave to amend and SNG
appealed to the Court of Appeal of California, Sixth Appellate District.
SNG alleged the District did not act pursuant to law, because the
District allocated SNG's water rights to California American Water
Company. SNG argued it owned overlying water rights in the Seaside
Basin and, thus, its claims were paramount to those of other water
rights holders. The court rejected this argument, because SNG retained the same water rights that it had prior to the District's decision;
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the District's decision only restricted SNG's use of the water to uses
that did not require a distribution system.
SNG contended that, because the District did not adopt all findings
before voting on SNG's application, the vote was invalid as a matter of
law. However, SNG had raised this argument in a previous action and
that court found the District acted within the District's rules. Invoking
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court refused to allow SNG to
re-litigate the issue.
SNG claimed insufficient evidence supported the District's findings. The court first reviewed evidence on the question of whether the
proposed distribution system would create or exacerbate an overdraft
condition. The court determined the evidence showed that pumping
would exceed replenishment and create an overdraft condition. Furthermore, the court reasoned this condition would reverse the gradient allowing seawater to mix with groundwater causing an unacceptable degradation of groundwater quality. The court held that, while
there was evidence showing there might not be an overdraft, the District reasonably concluded otherwise. There was also evidence SNG
did not satisfy the California Environmental Quality Act because SNG
changed its proposal after filing the required Environmental Impact
Report ("EIR"). Due to the overdraft risk and the inaccuracy of the
EIR, the court held the District proceeded properly.
Finally, SNG asserted an inverse condemnation claim for the deprivation of the right to use its property and a claim alleging a violation of
SNG's right to substantive due process. The court concluded these
claims were not ripe for adjudication because the District, in denying
SNG's proposal, had not reached a "final definitive position" regarding
all uses of SNG's property. The court thus affirmed the trial court's
decision on all counts.
Mark Terzaghi Howe
COLORADO
City of Black Hawk v. City of Central, No. 03SA295, 2004 Colo. LEXIS
691 (Colo. Sept. 13, 2004) (holding the water court did not err in finding Black Hawk satisfied the can and will statute where a nonbinding,
general resolution by Central City did not serve as a final denial of access to the reservoir site, and where Central City's expert testimony
that the requisite enlargement of the reservoir would be technically
challenging and financially burdensome was insufficient to defeat
Black Hawk's evidence that the project was technically feasible).
Black Hawk and Central City, two adjacent municipalities in Colorado located within the mountains of Gilpin County and the South
Platte River Basin, receive and depend upon water from Chase Gulch
Reservoir ("the Reservoir"). The Reservoir had a storage capacity of
602 acre-feet of water. Central City owned the property underlying the
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Reservoir and had 580 acre-feet of conditional water storage rights in
the Reservoir. Central City's conditional storage decree was senior in
priority to Black Hawk's conditional storage decree.
In 1992, Black Hawk applied for 600 acre-feet conditional water
storage rights in the Reservoir, which would have necessitated an
enlargement of the existing reservoir. Just nine days prior to trial,
Central City's city council passed a resolution barring Central City
from entering into any agreement allowing a third party to "use real
estate interests to construct other water projects not filed for adjudication by Central." Although other opposing parties eventually settled
with Black Hawk, at trial, Central City objected to Black Hawk's application. The District Court heard the case and, at the trial's conclusion,
awarded Black Hawk 600 acre-feet of conditional water storage rights
in the Reservoir.
Central City appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado, and it
considered, in relevant part, whether the water court erred in finding
Black Hawk satisfied the requirements of the "can and will" statute,
Colorado Revised Statute section 37-92-305(9) (b) (2003). The court
began its analysis by noting its standard of review mandated great deference to the water court's findings. The court then explained, an
applicant with a conditional water right must participate in diligence
proceedings to demonstrate he or she has taken the necessary steps to
put the waters covered by the right to beneficial use. The court further
stated, under the can and will statute, a court may not award a conditional water storage right unless the applicant can show "the waters can
and will be stored and beneficially used and the project can and will be
completed with diligence and within a reasonable time." The court
acknowledged an applicant must prove these factors by a substantial
probability, but added such a standard would necessarily entail "imperfect predictions of future events and conditions." Thus, the court clarified it would not impose the can and will statute's requirements rigidly
if an applicant otherwise met the legal standard of "establishing a nonspeculative intent to appropriate for beneficial use." Under this
framework, Central City proffered two arguments to convince the
court the water court erred in finding Black Hawk met the requirements of the can and will statute.
Specifically, Central City first argued Black Hawk did not satisfy the
can and will statute because it failed to prove it had a present right to
access the Reservoir. The court stated it was appropriate to consider
an applicant's present right or prospective ability to access a reservoir
site in order to determine if an applicant could complete a project.
However, the court clarified, access only constitutes one factor, not a
clear determination as to whether the applicant passed the can and will
test because contingencies within a water application do not automatically defeat the test. Central City argued precedent dictated Black
Hawk failed this prong of the can and will test because Central City

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

adopted a resolution prohibiting third party agreements to construct
water storage facilities on city property. Central City contended the
resolution effectively denied Black Hawk access to the property underlying its proposed conditional water storage right in the Reservoir.
The court disagreed and easily distinguished the earlier cases based on
the concept of finality: those cases involved private entity applicants
and final denials of access to state or federal property. Especially in
light of the fact that Central City waited until nine days before trial to
pass the resolution in question, the court observed, unlike the previous
cases, Central City's resolution was nonbinding, general in nature, and
did not even refer to Black Hawk or the Reservoir; thus, it did not qualify as a final denial of access. Therefore, with deference to the water
court's findings that Black Hawk satisfied all other requirements of the
can and will statute, the court concluded the water court did not err in
finding Black Hawk fulfilled the access requirement of the can and will
statute adequately.
Second, Central City contended Black Hawk did not satisfy the can
and will statute because it failed to prove enlarging the reservoir was
technically feasible. The court stated it was appropriate for the water
court to consider technical feasibility to determine if an applicant fulfilled the can and will test. Central City asserted Black Hawk's desired
enlargement of the Reservoir was not technically feasible based upon
Central City's expert who testified the Reservoir's capacity for water
storage was 1,117 acre-feet, and Black Hawk's enlargement exceeded
that limit by eighty-eight acre-feet. Hence, Central City's expert characterized Black Hawk's enlargement as technically challenging and
financially burdensome. However, Black Hawk's expert testified the
proposed enlargement of the Reservoir was technically feasible. The
court examined the expert testimony and concluded the trial court did
not err in finding Black Hawk presented sufficient evidence of technical feasibility to satisfy the requirements of the can and will statute.
Thus, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's
decision and remanded the case for further consistent proceedings.
Jessica L. Grether
In re the Application for Water Rights of United States, No. 03SA321,
2004 WL 2496684 (Colo. Nov. 8, 2004) (holding the state water court's
grant of a motion for stay pending resolution of a federal court proceeding was not an abuse of discretion where the federal claims would
not affect the water court's ability to quantify the federal reserved water
right; and the McCarran Amendment did not allow a state court to
evaluate or adjudicate federal administrative law claims at issue in a
federal case).
This case presented a challenge to a Colorado Water Court decision that granted a stay of the quantification proceeding for the Black
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Canyon in response to a motion by numerous environmental groups
("environmental groups"). Various private and public Colorado entities ("Colorado entities") challenged the stay as an abdication of the
water court's jurisdiction. The Colorado Supreme Court decided this
case pursuant to its original jurisdiction to review the water court for
an abuse of discretion.
In 1933, when President Hoover designated the Black Canyon as a
national monument, the United States acquired rights to water from
the Gunnison River through the reserved rights doctrine. The reserved rights doctrine entitled the United States to the quantity of water from the Gunnison River necessary to satisfy the purposes for which
Hoover reserved the Black Canyon. Because these water rights vested
at the time of reservation, the federal government could assert the
rights at any time without abandonment or loss of priority. In 1978 the
water court issued an interlocutory decree awarding the United States
absolute and conditional water rights for the Black Canyon.
In January 2001, the United States filed an application to quantify
its conditional water rights. Over 380 parties filed statements opposing
the application. The water court granted a stay of proceedings so the
United States could discuss settlements with opposing parties. The
environmental groups, however, did not have a chance to participate
in the negotiations. On April 2, 2003 the United States and the State
of Colorado entered into a settlement agreement whereby the United
States released its reserved right and claimed a lower year round base
flow. The United States also filed a motion to amend its quantification
application and filed a proposed amended application with the water
court.
On August 5, 2003 the environmental groups filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the
United States Department of the Interior, the National Park Service,
and the heads of both agencies. The environmental groups alleged
the United States violated provisions of federal law through decisions
regarding the protection and management of the Black Canyon Water
Resources. The district court denied the United States' motion to
dismiss and clarified that the district court retained jurisdiction to determine whether the agencies maintained their duty to protect the
Black Canyon's resources under the judicial review provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). The district court also explained it would not decide "the exact amount of water necessary to
fulfill the Park's purpose."
The environmental groups filed a written motion to the water
court, requesting the court stay the quantification proceeding until the
district court resolved the federal litigation, which the water court
granted. The Colorado entities challenged the stay, claiming the water
court's order staying the quantification proceeding constituted an "abdication of [the water court's] jurisdiction and responsibility to deter-
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mine issues regarding quantification of the federal reserved water
right." The Colorado entities also argued the stay irreparably prejudiced their ability to litigate the merits of the case.
The primary issue the court examined was whether the McCarran
Amendment's ("the Amendment") waiver of sovereign immunity allowed a state court to evaluate and adjudicate the federal agencies'
decisions regarding the quantification application. The court explained the Amendment allowed state courts to involuntarily join the
United States as a necessary party in comprehensive water rights adjudications. The court stated, despite the fact that Congress intended
the Amendment proceedings to be all-inclusive; Congress limited the
waiver of sovereign immunity to proceedings that determined or administered rights to the use of water. The court concluded the
Amendment did not suggest a state court should have jurisdiction to
review federal agency decisions for compliance with federal law. The
court supported this position by noting that the APA's language demonstrated Congress intended to hold administrative agencies answerable for their conduct only in federal courts.
Hence, the court concluded the Amendment did not provide a
waiver of sovereign immunity broad enough to allow the water court to
evaluate or adjudicate the federal agencies' decision-making processes
that led the United States to make the water applications. The court
determined the federal district court was the only court that could decide the environmental groups' claims, and the parties could not reach
a final resolution regarding the United States' reserved water rights for
the Black Canyon without both state and federal proceedings. Specifically, the federal court needed to determine whether the United
States' amended application complied with federal law and the water
court needed to quantify the water right.
Next, the court determined whether the water court abused its discretion by staying the state proceedings and allowing the federal court
to resolve federal issues first. The court explained it would uphold the
stay if the balance of prejudices and interests of the parties justified the
delay. As a framework to consider the relevant facts and circumstances, the court used the federal factors from Adolph Coors Co. v. Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co.: (1) the order in which the courts obtained
jurisdiction, (2) the adequacy of relief the state court could provide,
(3) comity, and (4) the need for comprehensive adjudication and the
coinciding desire to avoid piecemeal litigation.
The court reasoned that although the water court obtained jurisdiction before the federal court, the two actions would not resolve the
same issue and the federal court had sole authority to resolve the federal claim. Hence, the order ofjurisdiction did not convince the court
the water court abused its discretion.
The court determined that consideration of the relief available to
the parties favored the water court's award of a stay. The court ex-
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plained that if the water court entered a decree and the federal court
subsequently determined the United States violated federal law by
amending its application, the doctrine of res judicata would prevent
the United States from reopening the reserved water rights adjudication. When the court considered the "avoidable potential for conflict
between state and federal courts," it determined that comity favored
the stay.
Finally, the court determined that since the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the federal claims, the Amendment's goal of
avoiding piecemeal litigation and achieving comprehensive adjudication did not apply to warrant lifting the stay. Balancing competing
interests, the court stated the Colorado entities would not suffer as
much prejudice from the stay as the environmental groups would suffer if the water court refused to grant the stay, because the Colorado
entities were able to intervene in the federal case, but the environmental groups were not able to participate in the settlement negotiations.
The court found the district court retained exclusive jurisdiction
over the environmental groups' federal claims and the district court's
resolution of those claims could require the United States to claim a
broader reserved water right for the Black Canyon. Accordingly, the
court held that the water court acted within its discretion by staying its
proceedings until the district court resolves the federal litigation. Additionally, the court noted the balance of prejudices and competing
interests favored upholding the stay.
Justice Hobbs dissented, concluding the water court abused discretion by granting the stay. The dissent stated the court should vacate
the stay order, and provided the following four supporting arguments.
First, the dissent argued the federal court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the federal claims and the Amendment favored federal
courts to defer jurisdiction to state courts. Second, the dissent argued
the stay would deprive the federal courts of the water court's "comprehensive view of the interaction of all federal and state water fights on
the Gunnison River." Third, the dissent argued that the law favored
settlements in proceedings like this where state and federal parties own
rights to waters of the same stream. Finally, the dissent argued that by
upholding the stay, the majority underemphasized the harm the stay
causes to the State of Colorado and its water users by delaying finality.
In summary, the court upheld the stay and remanded the case back to
the water court.
Elizabeth Frost
WRWC, LLC v. City of Arvada, No. 02CV1622, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS
1360 (Colo. Ct. App. July 29, 2004) (holding that a groundwater right,
by itself, does not convey the right to use an easement appurtenant to
the land the water underlies).
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WRWC, L.L.C. ("WRWC") filed suit in the Jefferson County District
Court against the City of Arvada ("Arvada") and Avset Management
Services, L.L.C. ("Avset") alleging that Avset's planned subdivision
would interfere with WRWC's use of a road easement that crossed
Avset's land. WRWC also claimed Arvada substantially interfered with
WRWC's right to use a road easement across land that Veldkamp Flowers ("Veldkamp") had earlier conveyed to Arvada. Both easements
were appurtenant easements providing access to Veldkamp's land,
which overlaid WRWC's groundwater right and was the dominant estate. WRWC requested a preliminary injunction preventing Arvada
and Avset from adversely affecting WRWC's use of the easements. Arvada and Avset in turn requested summary judgment. The trial court
found that because WRWC only owned a non-tributary groundwater
right and some easements on Veldkamp's land. Further, WRWC's interests did not entitle WRWC to use of the easements on either Avset
or Arvada's land. Therefore, WRWC lacked standing and the trial
court granted Arvada's motion for summary judgment. WRWC appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
On appeal, WRWC made three arguments supporting its contention that it was entitled to use the road easement, which the court considered and rejected in turn. First, WRWC argued that because it
owned groundwater rights under Veldkamp's land, it possessed an interest in Veldkamp's dominant estate sufficient to entitle it to use of
the road easement. The court, however, did not agree with this argument. The court reasoned that WRWC's groundwater right did not
convey to WRWC the right to use the easement appurtenant to Veldkamp's land, because an appurtenant easement generally cannot benefit property other than the dominant estate and Colorado water rights
are separate from interests in land.
Next, WRWC argued that its ownership of easements on Veldkamp's land constituted sufficient interest in Veldkamp's land to support WRWC's use of the road easement. On this point, the court
found that although the agreement governing WRWC's easement on
Veldkamp's land stated that the easement "runs with the land," the
agreement did not create a possessory interest to which an easement
appurtenant could attach. Therefore, in the absence of a possessory
interest WIRWC's easement could not entitle WRWC to use of the road
easement, even in conjunction with WRWC's groundwater right.
Lastly, WRWC argued that the trial court should not have granted
summary judgment because further discovery might establish WRWC's
right to use the road easement under alternative theories such as estoppel or easement by prescription. Here, the court stated that WRWC
did not raise the issue at trial, so WRWC could not raise it on appeal.
The court also stated that in opposing summary judgment WRWC had
the burden to set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a
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genuine issue for trial. The court declared that WRWC's speculation,
as to what additional discovery may uncover, was insufficient to meet
this burden. Moreover, the court noted that under the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure, WRWC could have moved for a continuance to
conduct further discovery. However, WRWC did not.
In conclusion, the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected all of
WRWC's arguments and affirmed the trial court's entry of summary
judgment.
Jeff Gillio
CONNECTICUT
Ace Equipment Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 848 A.2d 474 (Conn. App. Ct.
2004) (holding owners of property abutting a non-navigable pond created by a dam have a right to use the pond for recreational purposes
when (1) the owners have an obligation to maintain the dam, (2) when
the pond bed is owned by another party, and (3) when the owners'
deed gives them use of the waterway for industrial purposes).
Hall's Pond ("Pond") is a man-made, non-navigable pond created
by damming Conat Brook. Ace Equipment Sales, Inc. ("Ace") and the
Buccino family are the only owners of land abutting the Pond and both
gained their ownership rights subsequent to the dam's erection. The
Buccinos own the deeded right to use the water from the Pond to operate a downstream mill and factory. They also have an obligation to
maintain the dam pursuant to an order from the department of environmental protection. Ace owned subaqueous land under the Pond
and brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and
damages, to preclude the Buccinos from using the Pond for recreational purposes. The Buccinos counterclaimed seeking injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment, and damages. The Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland, granted Boccinos' motion for summary judgment and awarded damages and injunctive relief. Ace subsequently
appealed to the Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Ace relied on the common law rules that stated ownership of the
bed beneath a non-navigable lake or pond gave the owner exclusionary
rights of use and riparian rights did not attach to merely abutting
landowners. Ace further claimed that because the Buccinos' chain of
title granted them the right to use the Pond for industrial purposes,
specifically to operate a mill and factory that express grant impliedly
prohibited them from using the Pond for other purposes, including
recreation.
Rather than following the common law rules purported by Ace, the
court instead adopted the civil law rule. The civil law rule does not
allow owners of subaqueous land under a pond to preclude the use of
the pond to abutting landowners who control the existence of the
pond itself and use it for recreational purposes. This rule treats ripar-
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ian rights as inherent rights incident to the ownership of land that
abuts or runs along a watercourse. The court noted that under this
rule, each riparian owner possesses an equal right to use the water for
reasonable recreational purposes.
The court added that when a natural stream was dammed for an
extended period of time, the resulting body of water was treated as a
natural body of water for riparian rights purposes. The court further
noted that the owner of land upon which a dam was constructed may
use the water for any purpose, provided non-interference with the
rights of other users.
The court also disagreed with Ace on its claim that the Buccinos
were only granted the right to use the Pond for industrial purposes.
The court found that an owner of land that abuts against a watercourse
possesses recreational water usage rights of that watercourse even if the
owner's deed does not specifically mention such use. The court thus
concluded that no material disputed facts existed and affirmed the
decision of the superior court. Therefore, the court held that the Buccinos were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Michael O'Loughlin
Avalon Bay Cmtys., Inc. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n of the Town of
Wdton, 832 A.2d I (Conn. 2003) (holding that a land developer's plan
does not require the issuance of an inland wetlands permit when the
plan falls outside the jurisdiction of the Inland Wetland and Watercourses Act).
Avalon Bay Communities, Inc. ("Avalon Bay"), an apartment complex management and land development corporation, brought an appeal against the Inland Wetlands Commission of the Town of Wilton
("Commission") in the Connecticut Supreme Court. The Commission
denied Avalon Bay's application for an inland wetlands permit. The
Superior Court in the Judicial District of New Britain dismissed Avalon
Bay's appeal. The Appellate Court granted the petition for review and
then transferred the appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
In May 1999 Avalon Bay applied for a permit in order to construct
an affordable housing complex on a 10.6 acre parcel of property. The
property contained two small wetlands areas totaling 0.32 acres. Avalon Bay's housing plan included regulated activities near the wetlands
and the Commission denied their permit application citing potential
impact to the wetlands. In November 1999 Avalon Bay submitted a
revised plan to the Commission that eliminated all activities in the wetlands area. Again, the Commission denied the permit request, this
time because the development occurring outside the wetlands potentially results in loss or reduction of the spotted salamander, which relies upon the wetlands for five weeks per year for a portion of its lifecycle. While the spotted salamander is not listed as a federal or state en-
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dangered, threatened, or special concern species, the Commission believed that loss or reduction of the spotted salamanders reduces wetlands biodiversity.
The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed Avalon Bay's dispositive issue of whether the Commission acted outside its jurisdiction by
denying the company a permit when its proposed construction would
not physically harm the wetlands. Avalon Bay argued that the Inland
Wetland and Watercourses Act ("Act") served to protect wetlands from
physical damage or intrusion, but not the wildlife relying on the wetlands for a portion of their life cycle. The Commission disputed Avalon Bay's interpretation and argued for a liberal construction of the
Act to include protection of wildlife.
The Act authorizes any municipality to create a board or commission to regulate activities affecting wetlands located within its limits and
to grant, deny, or limit any permit for a regulated activity. As concluded in Queach Corp. v. Inland Wetlands Commission, a commission is
permitted to regulate activities occurring outside of wetlands provided
the activities result in a likely impact or affect on wetlands or watercourses. To fully interpret the statute, the court first looked at its
meaning and words. The Act defines both wetlands and watercourses
and narrowly limits these terms to physical characteristics that do not
protect aspects of the wetlands, such as wildlife species. Therefore, the
court concluded the Act protects the physical characteristics of wetlands and not the wildlife like the spotted salamander.
Next, the court examined the legislative history of the statute. The
court noted the significance of the absence of the term "wildlife" from
the Act. In comparison, when the legislature protected wildlife in other
statutes, it did so expressly. The Act provides that certain, nonregulated uses of wetlands and watercourses are permitted, as long as they
do not disturb the wetlands or watercourses. In addition, certain Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection regulations allow for
the intentional hunting and taking of spotted salamanders. Thus, the
court concluded that since the legislature did not provide municipal
commissions with the authority to regulate the intentional taking of
wildlife, such as the spotted salamander, in wetlands and watercourses,
the legislature did not intend to authorize the commissions to deny
permits for incidental impacts to such wildlife.
Lastly, the court analyzed the legislative policy implemented by the
statute. The court noted that if the denial of a permit due to development near wetlands occurred based on the single consequence of reducing a species that relies on the wetland, this results in the commission's unlimited jurisdiction. Furthermore, every attempt to develop
property with nearby wetlands would require a review by a commission
to determine if the construction negatively impacts on the species.
The Commission argued that the Act was broad enough to include a
wetland species like the spotted salamander within its protection, but
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the court cited the operative language of the statute as the most important factor. The court noted that one of the broad purposes of the Act,
preventing loss of fish and other beneficial aquatic organisms, wildlife,
and vegetation, serves only to protect wildlife as a secondary effect of
protecting the wetlands themselves. The court also emphasized the
lack of evidence showing the classification of spotted salamanders as
beneficial wildlife. In addition, the court specifically noted that while
the Act requires the Commission to consider the irreversible and irretrievable loss of wetland or watercourse resources, the Act does not
define resources. Therefore, the Act could not broadly include wildlife
as the Commission contended. Ultimately, the court rejected the
Commission's broad interpretation of the statute.
In conclusion, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the
Inland Wetland and Watercourses Act did not confer jurisdiction over
wildlife or the biodiversity of wetlands and watercourses; therefore the
Commission acted outside its jurisdiction and Avalon Bay's revised development plan did not require an inland wetlands permit. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to render judgment
vacating the denial of the inland wetlands permit and remanded to the
Commission with direction to issue a declaratory ruling that Avalon
Bay's revised plan did not require a permit.
Julia Herron
Koch v. Litchfield Inland Wetlands Comm'n, No. CV30090655S, 2004
WL 1157405 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 11, 2004) (dismissing the appeal of
action in which the Litchfield Inland Wetlands Commission denied
part of an application to conduct regulated activities, where substantial
evidence in the record supporting the Commission's decision existed).
Sidney Koch and Sheila Nevins ("Koch") owned a twenty-one acre
parcel of land in the Town of Litchfield, which adjoined a pond named
Lake Floren ("Lake"). Koch filed an application with the Litchfield
Inland Wetlands Commission ("Commission") seeking a permit to
construct a boathouse, a septic tank for the boathouse, a utility trench,
a gravel driveway, a gazebo, two boardwalks, and a floating dock, all
within 150 feet of the shore of the Lake or the wetlands surrounding
the Lake. The Commission held a public hearing and voted to approve all activities except the gazebo and the septic tank. Koch appealed the Commission's decision to the Connecticut Superior Court,
Judicial District of Litchfield.
A court will generally uphold an agency decision where there is
substantial evidence in the record supporting that decision. Moreover,
the party who challenges an agency's decision carries the burden of
demonstrating that no substantial evidence in the record to support
the agency's decision exists. Here, Koch argued the Commission
lacked substantial evidence to deny the proposed gazebo and septic
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tank, and presented evidence from a civil engineer and a soil scientist
that these activities would not result in an impact to an inland wetlands
or watercourses resource.
The court determined the gazebo and the septic tank both qualified as regulated activities because Koch planned to build them within
150 feet and 100 feet, respectively, from the Lake shore. Additionally,
the Commission argued its northwest Conservation District's expert
concluded these activities around the Lake would only degrade water
quality, since septic systems greatly impact the water quality of lakes. In
addition, the expert stated the water quality standard given to the Lake
by the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection
("CDEP") meant the CDEP potentially considered the Lake to serve as
a drinking water supply or that the Lake was a tributary to a drinking
water supply. Therefore, the Commission argued the excavation for
the septic tank so close to the Lake was sufficient for the Commission
to conclude that these activities would cause or had the potential to
cause pollution of the Lake, and constituted significant impact activities as defined by Connecticut statutes. The court agreed the Commission was entitled to consider the possible adverse effects that the construction of the gazebo and installation of the septic tank would have
on the Lake. The court stated these considerations, when combined
with the Commission's expert testimony, yielded sufficient evidence for
the Commission to deny permission for the gazebo and the septic tank.
Koch failed to carry the burden of demonstrating the record did not
support the Commission's decision.
Therefore, the court dismissed Koch's appeal and sustained the
Commission's decision to deny the permit to build the gazebo and the
septic tank because substantial evidence in the record supported the
Commission's decision.
Stacy Hochman
FLORIDA
Thomas v. S.W. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 864 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that a subsequently enacted Florida statute supersedes a previously enacted statute and that the consumptive use of water is therefore controlled by the Southwest Florida Management District).
Milo Thomas ("Thomas") applied to the Southwest Florida Water
Management District ("SFWMD") for a permit to increase his water
consumption from 345,000 to 970,000 gallons of water per day. Due to
the potential impact of the additional water consumption on the
Northern Tampa Bay Water Resource Assessment Project area, the
SFWMD denied his application. Thomas appealed the administrative
decision, arguing that the SFWMD erred in denying his application for
an increase because, as a property owner in Pasco County, he possessed
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a water right superior to the rights of any user outside of Pasco County.
Thomas relied on the Florida Water Production statute, §
373.1961 (1) (e), and other evidence to prove the legislature's intent to
preserve the water rights of the residents of Pasco County. The Florida
District Court of Appeals disagreed based the supremacy and exclusivity of the SFWMD's permitting authority set forth in the Florida Superseded Laws and Regulations statute, § 373.217.
Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the SFWMD and held that
the SFWMD possessed exclusive permitting authority pursuant to the
Florida Superseded Laws and Regulations statute.
Christina Valerio

HAWAII
Lana'i Co. v. Land Use Comm'n, 97 P.3d 372 (Haw. 2004) (holding:
(1) the land use commission's interpretation of agreement and order
for water use to develop golf course was clearly erroneous; and (2) remand was necessary because evidence implying real estate developer
breached agreement and order for water use existed).
Lana'i Company, Inc. ("LCI") sought to expand the Manele Bay
Hotel on the island of Lana'i by constructing a golf course near the
resort. The Land Use Commission ("LUC") approved LCI's petition to
reclassify land for the golf course on the condition that LCI not use
potable water from a high-level aquifer for the project. When LCI used
water from the high-level aquifer, several parties appealed to LUC demanding that LCI stop such water use. LUC issued an order commanding LCI to stop using high-level aquifer water. LCI appealed to
the Second Circuit Court, which reversed LUC's order. LUC and others appealed to the Hawai'i Supreme Court.
LCI's predecessor in interest filed a petition with LUC to amend
the land use district boundaries at Manele, from rural and agricultural
districts to urban districts, for purposes of developing a golf course.
The following year, Lanaians for Sensible Growth ("Sensible Growth"),
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, and LCI signed a memorandum of
agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement stated that LCI would (1)
not use water from high-level ground water aquifers to maintain or
operate the proposed golf course; and (2) achieve all irrigation for the
golf course through alternative, non-potable water sources. Sensible
Growth and LCI submitted proposed findings of fact ("findings"), conclusions of law, and orders to LUC. LUC subsequently granted LCI's
petition in 1991 ("1991 Order") and ordered reclassification of the
Manele land.
Pursuant to the 1991 Order, the Maui County Council ("Council")
submitted a letter to Maui's mayor. The letter noted that LCI sought
use of water from a high-level aquifer in direct violation of the Agree-
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ment. The letter requested the mayor stop development of the golf
course pursuant to LCI's Agreement violation. LCI responded that it
planned to use brackish effluent from the high-level aquifer in compliance with local law. Maui's mayor subsequently agreed with LCI, noting there was no specific prohibition against using high-level brackish
water.
The County of Maui Planning Department ("County") joined the
Council to contend that LCI was violating the Agreement, as well as the
1991 Order, by using high-level aquifer water. The County argued that
approval of the golf course project was based on representations made
by LCI that LCI would not use high-level aquifer water for golf course
construction. LCI responded that it was complying with all conditions
imposed upon it with respect to the project.
Subsequent to the Council and the County's complaints, LUC issued an order for all involved parties to show cause why the Manele
land should not revert to its former classification ("Show Cause Order"). LUC based the Show Cause Order on the belief that LCI failed
to act pursuant to the 1991 Order by using high-level aquifer water. In
1996, after Sensible Growth, the County, and LCI submitted testimonies and arguments, LUC found that LCI had failed to act in accordance with the 1991 Order. LUC ordered LCI to cease use of highlevel aquifer water, as well as file a detailed plan outlining how LCI
would use water from alternative non-potable water sources, excepting
the high-level aquifer ("1996 Order"). LCI appealed LUC's decision to
the circuit court.
The circuit court initially upheld both LUC's finding that LCI violated the 1991 Order and LUC's order that LCI submit a plan to obtain
water from sources outside of the high-level aquifer. LCI filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, specifically requesting that the
1996 Order be reversed. Following a denial of that motion by the circuit court and a dismissal of appeal by the court, the circuit court reversed the 1996 Order. The circuit court held that LUC's conclusion
that LCI violated the 1991 Order was arbitrary and capricious and
clearly erroneous. LUC appealed to the Hawai'i Supreme Court.
The court noted it reviewed agency decisions that presented mixed
questions of fact and law under the clearly erroneous standard because
the agency decisions were based upon facts and circumstances specific
to the given case. The court stated that a mixed decision was clearly
erroneous when (1) the record lacked substantial evidence to support
the decision; or (2) an appellate court was left with a firm conviction
that a mistake had been made, despite substantial evidence supporting
the decision.
In addressing the circuit court's ruling that LUC's determination
that the 1996 Order was clearly erroneous, the court first looked at the
plain language of the 1991 Order, specifically the 1991 Order's mandate ordering LCI not to use high-level aquifer water. LCI argued the
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language of the 1991 Order only prohibited the use of potable water
from the high-level aquifer and, therefore, use of non-potable water
from that aquifer was permissible. LUC and Sensible Growth responded that the 1991 Order prohibited use of all water from the highlevel aquifer. The court found that the plain language of the 1991 Order did not prohibit use of all high4evel aquifer water. Specifically, the
language of the 1991 Order did not forbid use of non-potable water
from the high-level aquifer, nor did the 1991 Order's language indicate that the high-level aquifer only contained potable water. As such,
the court found the 1996 Order to be clearly erroneous because of the
lack of evidence that the 1991 Order meant to exclude LCI from using
non-potable water from the high-level aquifer.
The court next considered LUC's explicit rejection of Sensible
Growth's recommended version of the 1991 Order. Sensible Growth
proposed that no water from the high-level aquifer should be used for
golf course purposes. The court noted that LUC, after looking at Sensible Growth's proposal, adopted LCI's proposed findings regarding
the high-level aquifer into the 1991 Order. Specifically, LUC entered
findings into the 1991 Order that were identical to LCI's proposals.
The court found that because LUC expressly rejected Sensible
Growth's proposal to forbid use of all high-level aquifer water, LUC
could not reasonably assert that it intended to prohibit LCI from using
any high-level aquifer water.
The court lastly noted that a map submitted to LUC clearly indicated that water sources not precluded from use by LCI were inside the
high-level aquifer. Specifically, although a well and the Palawai Basin
were both located inside the high-level aquifer, LUC did not expressly
bar use of those water sources. In fact, a finding from the 1991 Order
recommended use of these water sources because of their brackish
waters. In light of the aforementioned three analyses, the court found
the information submitted pursuant to the Show Cause Order was insufficient to support the conclusion that the 1991 Order barred LCI
from using any high-level aquifer water. As such, the court held the
1996 Order was clearly erroneous.
The court also addressed whether LCI had violated the 1991 Order. Sensible Growth argued that, even if the 1991 Order did not bar
LCI from using any high-level aquifer water, the 1991 Order did bar
LCI from using high-level aquifer potable water. Specifically, Sensible
Growth claimed that the circuit court erred in reversing the 1996 Order because LCI had used potable water from the high-level aquifer in
violation of the 1991 Order. Because LUC had made no specific findings regarding whether LCI had used potable water from the high-level
aquifer, the court remanded the issue back to the circuit court. The
court instructed the circuit court to remand the issue to LUC to clarify
whether LCI had used high-level aquifer potable water. The court thus
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upheld the circuit court's reversal of the 1996 Order, but remanded
the case to LUC to clarify whether LCI had violated the 1991 Order.
Kyle K Chang
IDAHO
McKay v. Boise Project Bd. of Control, No. 28660, 2004 Idaho LEXIS
149 (Idaho 2004) (reversing the lower court's award of damages for the
destruction of a cash crop when the Boise Project Control Board raised
the reservoir water level pursuant to a flowage easement since the plain
language of the easement contained no ambiguity, the activity remained within the parameters of the easement, and the activity was
reasonable; affirming the lower court's holding that the Boise Project
Control Board does not qualify for immunity because the decision to
raise reservoir levels was operational and not discretionary).
In 1979 the Boise Project Control Board ("Project") obtained a
flowage easement from ajudgment that allowed the Project to raise the
level of water in the Hubbard Reservoir to 2,771 feet for any routine
irrigation purpose. The judgment did not require the Project to give
any notice before changing the water level in the reservoir. In 1992
Darwin and Patricia McKay ("McKay") leased a parcel of land located
on the Hubbard Reservoir, which the), used to grow turf grass as a cash
crop. During the spring of 1997, the Project raised the water level in
the Hubbard Reservoir to 2,767.8 feet as part of a plan to provide water
for irrigation. The high water damaged a portion of McKay's crop.
McKay sued the Project for the damage to his crop in the District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District. McKay claimed the Project negligently used the flowage easement and the Project intentionally trespassed on his leasehold. The district court rejected the Project's defense of governmental immunity for performing discretionary functions. The district court then awarded McKay damages because the
Project breached its duty to manage the flowage easement in a reasonable manner and in accordance with the 1979 judgment. Accordingly,
the district court issued a permanent injunction that changed the
scope of the flowage easement from allowing flooding for routine irrigation operations the Project may desire, to provide that the Project
can only flood McKay's estate in the good faith pursuit of legitimate
irrigation goals. The Project appealed the district court's decision to
the Supreme Court of Idaho.
On appeal, McKay argued he lacked privity to the 1979 flowage
easement. McKay asserted he was not a party to the 1979 judgment
and thus not bound by thatjudgment. However, the court determined
McKay failed to raise the issue in a timely manner as required by Idaho
Appellate Rule 15. Therefore, the court refused to consider the issue
of privity.
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Next, the court reversed the district court's determination of negligence by finding no ambiguity in the plain language of the easement
and no unreasonable activity by the Project. The court held the 1979
judgment contained no ambiguity given the plain language of the
easement that allowed the Project to raise the water level for any activity supporting the irrigation of fields. Since the Project did not raise
the water level above 2,771 feet and their purpose supported irrigation,
the Project's activities did not violate the plain language of the easement. Additionally, the court noted McKay planted his crop below the
2,771-foot level at his own risk. The court also held McKay lacked
standing to assert wasteful use of water as a violation of an alleged duty
owed to him, because the statutes relied upon by McKay only allowed
negligence claims by other users of the water, the State, or a servient
estate to an easement only if the waste directly caused the harm.
McKay did not qualify as one of these categories. Therefore, McKay
could not recover under a theory of waste; the Project could not act
negligently if it did not owe McKay a duty to act reasonably in regards
to waste.
Finally, the court addressed the Project's claim of immunity. The
court held that only discretionary functions carried out by a governmental entity and its employees retain immunity from tort claims. The
court considered routine matters, such as the decision of the Project to
raise the reservoir water level for irrigation purposes, operational in
nature and not subject to immunity.
In conclusion, the court reversed the permanent injunction, vacated the lower court's damage award, and remanded for further proceedings.
David B. Oakley
LOUISIANA
Buckskin Hunting Club v. Bayard, 868 So. 2d 266 (La. Ct. App. 2004)
(affirming the grant of a permanent injunction prohibiting hunters
from entering private land because: (1) no public access right existed
to private land subject to intermittent flooding, (2) no public use right
existed to private waterways merely because the waterway was navigable, and (3) public use right to banks of navigable public waterways did
not include right to hunt).
The Buckskin Hunting Club ("Club") filed suit in the 16th Judicial
District Court, Parish of Iberia, seeking an injunction to prohibit further trespassing by a group of hunters who had entered land leased by
the Club without permission. The hunters claimed in defense that
navigable public and private man-made waterways through the land, as
well as intermittent flooding, both created a public right to use the
land surrounding the waterways. The district court, after considering
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multiple issues, granted the permanent injunction. The hunters appealed.
In affirming the district court in full, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Third Circuit quoted extensively from the district court's
findings and conclusions. First, the court affirmed the district court's
holding that while banks of a navigable public waterway through private land were subject to public use, intermittent flooding of the surrounding land did not convert such land to "banks" that were therefore available for public use.
Next, the court affirmed the district court's holding that no public
use right existed in the Club's private waterways. The hunters alleged
four reasons for finding that a public use right does exist: (1) the private waterways on the Club's land negatively affected the navigability of
other local public waterways; (2) state funds had been used to clean
the banks of the private waterways; (3) mere navigability in fact created
a public use right; and (4) because the Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") could seek regulatory control over the private waterways, a
public use right arose.
The court affirmed the district court's holdings that: (1) the hunters failed to provide adequate factual support for the contention that
the private waterways had decreased or eliminated the navigability of
local public waterways; (2) use of state funds on private property did
not create a public use right unless the government contracted for
those rights; (3) a public use right did not arise merely because a river
could be used for navigation; and (4) whether the Corps could seek
regulatory control over a waterway did not affect the issue of public use
of that waterway.
Finally, the court addressed the hunters' contention that even if
there was no public use right to private waterways, there was a public
use right to the banks of navigable public waterways. The hunters argued the district court should not have granted the Club an injunction
denying the hunters the right to hunt on the banks of the public waterways. The court agreed there was a public use right to the banks of
navigable public waterways. However, that public use right did not
allow the entire spectrum of possible public use. The use right that
arose was limited solely to those purposes incidental to the use of the
stream's navigational properties. These incidental uses included
emergency use during shipwrecks, drying of fishing nets, and resting
from the waters. Because the court found no error in any of the district court's determinations, the court affirmed the decision of the district court to grant the Club an injunction.
Matthew Sarles
Rizzo v. Nichols, 867 So. 2d 73 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming award of
damages to landowners whose property flooded because their
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neighbor changed the natural drainage of water across the landowners' property, knowing the change would cause water damage).
Jasper and Mary Rizzo ("Rizzos") moved into a house in Alexandria, Louisiana. At that time, the adjacent lot was vacant and the Rizzos' property did not flood when it rained. Heath Nichols ("Nichols")
purchased the vacant lot next to the Rizzos' property and began constructing a duplex apartment there. After Nichols began construction,
the Rizzos experienced flooding and standing water on their property
whenever it rained. Mr. Rizzo discussed the drainage problem with
Nichols several times, but Nichols did not take any action to prevent
the Rizzo property from flooding. The Rizzos sued Nichols for damages in Alexandria City Court. After a bench trial, the judge concluded
Nichols knew his construction project would cause the Rizzo property
to flood and the construction was the cause-in-fact of the flooding.
The judge awarded the Rizzos actual, inconvenience, and mental anguish damages. Nichols appealed the liability determination and damage awards to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana.
The Louisiana Civil Code establishes the general right of landowners to use their own properties as they choose. However, a landowner
may be liable for damages where the landowner interferes with a
neighbor's right to enjoy the neighbor's own property. A landowner is
liable to a neighbor for damaging the neighbor's property if: (1) the
landowner knew, or should have know, that the action would cause
damage; (2) the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of
reasonable care; and (3) the landowner failed to exercise such reasonable care. The trier of fact is responsible for making this liability determination based on the particular circumstances of each case.
Mr. Rizzo testified at trial that he informed Nichols of the drainage
problem shortly after Nichols began construction. Nichols testified
that he contacted two plumbers after Mr. Rizzo approached him.
However, Nichols did not take any further action to resolve the drainage problem. Instead, Mr. Rizzo installed a catch basin on his own
property to prevent his property from flooding. The court concluded
that given this testimony, the trial judge did not err in determining
that Nichols knew that constructing the duplex on his property would
damage the Rizzos' property and that Nichols could have prevented
the damage by exercising reasonable care.
To recover under the law of vicinage, the aggrieved party must
demonstrate a casual link between the damage sustained and the
neighboring landowner's action or inaction. At trial, the previous
owner of the Rizzos' property testified that he never experienced
flooding when he lived on the property. Rather, water drained from
his property through the lower-lying area that ran across the adjacent
vacant lot, now owned by Nichols. Mr. Rizzo likewise testified that before Nichols began construction, his property did not flood and water
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drained across the adjacent lot. The court concluded that based on
this evidence, the trial judge did not err in ruling that Nichol's construction project was the cause-in-fact of the damage to the Rizzos'
property.
In a vicinage action a plaintiff may recover general damages, as well
as damages for mental anguish, discomfort, irritation, anxiety, and loss
of use and/or enjoyment of his property. A trial court has great discretion in awarding damages and an appellate court may not disturb that
award absent a clear abuse of discretion. The court concluded the record supported the award of actual and inconvenience damages because Mr. Rizzo installed a catch basin on his property and made repairs to his water-damaged shed. The court also concluded that the
award of mental anguish was supported by the record because the Rizzos' backyard become a breeding ground for mosquitoes, the shed
flooded and was not usable until a week after the water receded, and
the condition of the property caused tension between the Rizzos. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's liability determination
and damage awards.
Cheryl Miller
Walker Lands, Inc. v. East Carroll Parish Police Jury, 871 So. 2d 1258
(La. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the lake and drainage ditch were
formed through accretion or alluvion, rather than through chute or
neck cut-off; that the lake and drainage ditch were not navigable and,
thus, were privately owned; that actions for trespass, rather than permanent injunction, were the proper vehicle for the landowner to prevent his/her property from being exploited for recreational purposes;
and that the trial court acted within its discretion in unilaterally converting the state's motion for suspensive appeal into a devolutive appeal).
Walker Lands, Inc. ("Walker Lands") owned property that included
Gassoway Lake, a landlocked shallow lake, and a drainage ditch. Gassoway Lake formed sometime after 1880 when the Mississippi River
slowly moved eastward, leaving behind dry land and a shallow swale.
The shallow swale eventually became Gassoway Lake. Walker Lands
later purchased the land that included Gassoway Lake in 1974.
Walker Lands filed suit seeking an injunction against the State of
Louisiana ("State") and the public-at-large to stop all public use of Gassoway Lake and the drainage ditch. Walker Lands also sought a declaratory judgment regarding its ownership status with respect to Gassoway Lake and the drainage ditch. The District Court, Parish of East
Carroll, entered a judgment in favor of landowner and against the
State. The State appealed the judgment in the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, which affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

The court first addressed the State's argument that evidence at trial
showed that Gassoway Lake was a former bed of the Mississippi River,
thus the State owned Gassoway Lake. The court noted that the central
issue with respect to the State's argument was the creation of Gassoway
Lake and the effect of the movement of the Mississippi River. In resolving this issue, the court found that Walker Lands' predecessors-intitle were the riparian landowners of the property that sat on the bank
of the Mississippi River when it changed course and began shifting
eastward sometime after 1880. The court further noted that Walker
Lands' predecessors-in-title began to acquire, through alluvion, the
new land that existed when the Mississippi River shifted eastward. Because Louisiana law established that any alluvion or dereliction forming along the banks of a river belongs to the riparian landowners who
own the land adjacent to the river when the river shifts course, Walker
Lands' predecessors-in-title owned both the newly formed dry land and
Gassoway Lake. Thus, Walker Lands possessed ownership of Gassoway
Lake.
The court next addressed the State's argument that the State
owned Gassoway Lake since the Lake remained navigable and connected to the Mississippi River as a channel, and therefore qualified as
public water under the law. In making this argument, the State
pointed out that the Mississippi River frequently floods Gassoway Lake
and the lands between the lake and the river. Similarly, the State argued that under Louisiana law, the State owns all bodies of water
within its territory when the state joined the Union in 1812. Finally,
the State argued that Gassoway Lake and the drainage ditch are navigable bodies of water and the State owns all navigable bodies of water.
The court rejected all of these arguments. First, the court noted
that privately owned land does not become part of a navigable body of
water when a nearby navigable body of water overflows its normal bed
and temporarily covers the property. The flooding of the Mississippi
River was therefore irrelevant. Next, because Gassoway Lake did not
form until the late 1800s, when the Mississippi River shifted eastward, it
did not exist in 1812. Further, the court noted that a body of water is
navigable if it, as the body of water normally sits, is capable of use for a
commercial purpose over which trade and travel takes place in the customary modes of trade and travel. The court held that recreational use
of a body of water was not enough to establish commercial use of the
body of water. Thus, the court held that Gassoway Lake was a nonnavigable body of water that a private entity owned. In short, Gassoway
Lake and the drainage ditch were private property; the State did not
possess ownership.
The court next addressed the trial court's issuance of a permanent
injunction. While the State argued that the judgment was overly broad
because it enjoined use of the Mississippi River, the court held that the
permanent injunction failed on other grounds. Specifically, the court
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noted that Walker Lands and the State were the only parties involved
in the lawsuit at trial and no other persons or private entities were involved. Further, the court found no direct evidence in the record of
any direct violation by State officials or State departments attempting
to invade Walker Lands' property. Consequently, no justiciable controversy between Walker Lands and the State or the public-at-large existed. Thus, the trial court improperly issued a permanent injunction
against both the State's use of the property and the public's-at-large
use of the property; accordingly, the court reversed the permanent
injunction. In doing so, the court noted trespass actions are the
proper vehicle for the landowner to use in order to prevent the exploitation of his/her property for recreational purposes.
Finally, the state argued that the trial judge erred by unilaterally
converting its motion for a suspensive appeal into a devolutive appeal.
Specifically, the trial judge marked out the word suspensive and wrote
in devolutive on the draft order the State submitted. The court concluded that under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, the trial
judge retained discretion to convert the motion.
In conclusion, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that
Walker Lands owned Gassoway Lake and the surrounding lands; reversed the trial court's grant of a permanent injunction; and remanded
the matter to the trial court for the calculation of trial court costs, assessed equally against the parties.
Benjamin M. Petre
MAINE
S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. AP-03-70, 2004 Me.
Super. LEIS 115 (Me. Super. Ct. May 4, 2004) (holding that license
renewal for hydroelectric dams required certification subject to water
quality certification pursuant to the Clean Water Act).
S.D. Warren Company ("Warren") owned and operated the Dundee, Gambo, Little Falls, Mallison Falls, and Saccarappa hydroelectric
generating dam projects ("Projects") on the Presumpscot River. The
Projects provided electricity to Warren's paper mill. When the Projects' operating licenses lapsed, Warren filed for renewal. Along with
his application for continued operations, he also requested certification. In April 2003 the Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP") approved the applications and granted certification subject to
several conditions. Warren appealed the order to the Maine Board of
Environmental Protection ("BEP"). The BEP subsequently denied his
appeal.

On appeal to the Superior Court of Maine, Warren contended the
BEP erred by requiring the Projects to pass water quality certification
under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The CWA requires any application for a federal permit or license for an activity that may result in a

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

discharge is subject to certification. A discharge is any addition to the
water source, despite the nonexistence of pollutants. The court held
that because the Projects rerouted the natural flow of the river, this
constituted a discharge subject to certification under the CWA.
The relevant water quality certification required the Projects maintain seasonally varied minimum flows, install eel and fish passage, and
develop and implement a recreational facility enhancement plan.
Warren argued these requirements were void, stating the BEP could
not impose conditions to enhance the aquatic habitat. Further, Warren contended as long as some part of the water supported the designated uses, the Projects met the standards.
The BEP previously ruled increased flows in the bypass reach assure the waters could support all indigenous aquatic species. The
court upheld BEP's conclusion, reasoning there was ample evidence
that DEP had the authority to restore expired fish species and increase
the populations of existing species. Thus, the BEP's conclusions regarding minimum flows were not in error. Further, the BEP found
that installation of upstream and downstream passage for fish and eels
ensured the waterways remained suitable for fishing and habitat since
the dams at each Project affected both upstream eel migration and
downstream fish and eel passage. The court upheld this finding as
sufficiently supported by the record. The court also upheld the BEP's
finding with respect to recreational facilities. The relevant state statute
dictated that this water should remain suitable for recreation. The
Projects eliminated the opportunity for fishing and prevented access to
many areas of the river. Consequently, the court concluded Warren
was required to implement a recreational facility enhancement plan
pursuant to the BEP's ruling.
Warren also asserted the imposition of these conditions violated
Maine's antidegradation policy by reducing the Projects' average annual generation rates from 40.5 to 34.5 million kWh. The court held
this reduction was not enough to violate the antidegradation policy.
Next, Warren claimed the BEP's reliance on the Bureau of Land
and Water Quality's Hydropower Project Flow and Water Level Policy
("Water Level Policy"), absent proper rulemaking procedures, was inappropriate. The BEP found, and the court agreed, the DEP relied on
a mere presumption as to the flow needed to meet aquatic life and
habitat standards. Because this presumption was rebuttable, it did not
carry the force and effect of law, and was therefore an acceptable standard for guidance.
Warren also claimed the BEP erred in its interpretation of the instantaneous dissolved oxygen criterion. Warren argued the standard
should have been a calculation based on a daily average, not an instantaneous measurement. In determining the intent of the legislature,
the court first looked to the plain meaning of the statute and then to
the legislative history. The court determined that reading the statute
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as requiring an average was unreasonable. If oxygen levels dropped
below minimum for any length of time, there would not be enough
oxygen in the water to sustain fish. Therefore, the BEP correctly interpreted the criterion as a matter of law.
Finally, Warren argued the BEP's re-opener provisions were void.
This argument failed because the court concluded the provisions were
necessary to ensure the state's water quality standards. Further, the
provisions allowed Warren notice and a hearing, as well as an opportunity to appeal. Thus, the court held the BEP correctly included the reopener provisions.
In summary, the Superior Court of Maine affirmed the decisions of
the BEP because the evidence in the record was consistent with their
judgment.
JenniferSu/i
MICHIGAN
City of Brighton v. Township of Hamburg, 677 N.W.2d 349 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2004) (affirming that the Michigan National Resources and Environmental Protection Act preempted a township ordinance regulating
permissible wastewater discharge levels into state waterways).
The city of Brighton ("Brighton") applied to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") to expand its discharge
permit for its wastewater treatment plant. The township of Hamburg
("Hamburg") filed an objection to Brighton's request with DEQ. The
referee in the administrative hearing held in favor of Brighton. DEQ
then issued Brighton a revised National Pollution Discharge Elimination Permit ("NPDEP"). However, to prevent the expansion of Brighton's wastewater treatment plant, Hamburg subsequently passed an
ordinance that imposed more stringent restrictions on wastewater discharges than the restrictions imposed by NPDEP. Brighton filed suit in
the Livingston Circuit Court, contending Michigan's National Resources and Environmental Protection Act ("NREPA") preempted
Hamburg's ordinance. The trial court granted Brighton's motion for
summary disposition on the grounds that NREPA preempted Hamburg's ordinance. Hamburg appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court affirmed the preemption ruling.
To review the trial court's preemption ruling, the court applied the
principles articulated in People v. Llewellyn. Llewellyn established a twopart test for determining whether state law precludes a municipality
from enacting an ordinance. Pursuant to Llewellyn, state law preempts
a local ordinance if: (1) the ordinance is in direct conflict with the
state statutory scheme; or (2) the state statutory scheme occupies the
field of regulation that the municipality seeks to enter, even where
there is no direct conflict between the two regulatory schemes. The
court found the second part of the Llewellyn test applicable, and there-
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fore did not address whether a direct conflict between the ordinance
and the state statutory scheme existed.
The second part of the Llewellyn test consists of four guidelines.
State law preempts local law if the: (a) state law expressly provides that
its regulation is exclusive; (b) legislative history implies preemption;
(c) regulatory scheme is comprehensive and pervasive; or (d) nature of
the regulated subject matter necessitates preemption. The court concluded the first two guidelines did not mandate preemption, because
the NREPA did not contain an express preemption provision and the
inconclusive legislative history of the NREPA regarding whether the
legislature intended the NREPA to preempt local law. However, after
applying the third and fourth guidelines, the court concluded the
NREPA preempted Hamburg's ordinance.
The court, in addressing the third guideline, concluded the legislature, by passing the NREPA, created a comprehensive and pervasive
state regulatory scheme. Under the NREPA, the DEQ was the sole
agency authorized to establish pollution control standards and to issue
permits for point source discharges into state waters. The DEQ also
possessed exclusive criminal and civil enforcement authority and could
seek injunctive relief for any violations of the NREPA or permits issued
under the NREPA. The court concluded the far-reaching powers
granted to the DEQ indicated that the legislature impliedly intended
the NREPA to preempt local laws regarding the field of wastewater discharge regulation into state waterways.
Regarding the fourth guideline, the court concluded the subject
matter of the regulation, waste discharge into Michigan's interconnected waterways, called for a statewide, uniform system of regulation. Through the NREPA, the legislature gave the DEQ sole authority
for establishing and enforcing standards, and issuing discharge permits
for all state waterways. The legislature, by vesting one agency with the
power to regulate all state waterways, recognized that protection of
state waterways required statewide, consistent, and coherent uniform
policy. The court further noted that a patchwork of inconsistent local
regulations substantially undermines the state's ability to control water
pollution.
Additionally, the court noted that its application of Llewellyn in
other environmental law cases reinforced its conclusion that the
NREPA preempted Hamburg's ordinance. For example, the court
previously held hazardous waste disposal statutes preempted local laws,
because of the comprehensive statutory scheme and the subject matter
necessitated statewide uniformity and consistency. Accordingly, the
court affirmed the trial court's preemption ruling.
CheIyl Miller
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MINNESOTA
Gillette v. Peterson, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 614 (Minn. Ct. App. June
1, 2004) (affirming the district court's decision that defendants' construction of dams on private property across a creek violated the doctrine of "reasonable use" and environmental laws where the dams
harmed downstream property owners).
Landowners, the Gillettes and the Sheelys (collectively "Gillettes"),
brought suit against adjacent landowners, the Petersons, alleging that
field crossings on the Peterson property prevented drainage resulting
in damage to the Gillettes' crops. The Petersons installed three field
crossings across Roberts Creek that impaired upstream drainage, diminished water flow, and degraded water quality, all resulting in less
dissolved oxygen downstream.
The Mower County District Court held that the Petersons violated
the doctrine of "reasonable use" and state environmental quality standards by constructing the dams without a public water works permit.
The district court awarded the Gillettes damages under the Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act ("MERA") and the Petersons appealed.
On appeal, the Petersons contended they did not violate the doctrine of "reasonable use" and no basis for awarding damages existed,
because the creek was not considered public water within their property boundaries. The doctrine of "reasonable use" requires: (1) a reasonable necessity for water drainage; (2) the property owner must take
reasonable care to avoid unnecessary injury to the burdened land; (3)
the benefit to the drained land must outweigh the gravity of harm to
the burdened land; and (4) drainage must be accomplished by reasonably improving and aiding the natural system of drainage if practicable.
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed the district court's
findings that the Petersons did not take reasonable care when designing the field crossings to avoid harm to the adjacent, downstream landowners. The Petersons acknowledged the availability of less harmful
alternatives. The court found no utility accruing to the Peterson property that outweighed the gravity of the harm to the adjacent landowners' properties. Accordingly, the court held the district court did not
err in its finding that the Petersons violated the doctrine of "reasonable use."
The court found that the State may require permits even if the
field crossings were not located on public waters. The court held the
Petersons needed to obtain a permit, since the field crossings changed
and diminished the course and current of the public watercourse
downstream of the Petersons' property. In conclusion, the court upheld both of the district court's rulings and found the district court did
not err in awarding damages under MERA.
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Michael Graetz
MONTANA
Hidden Hollow Ranch v. Fields, 92 P.3d 1185 (Mont. 2004) (holding:
(1) the district court did not exceed its jurisdiction when it recognized
the existence of an independent source of water, determined that
source's flow rate, and settled controversies between appropriators
from water source; (2) the district court properly denied a party's motion to certify the issue involving controversy as to the source of water
rights to the chief water judge; and (3) the district court did not deprive a party of due process of law by not permanently modifying the
decree).
The dispute in this case, which concerned the appropriate distribution of water from the Confederate Creek and its tributaries, related
back to the Confederate Creek Decree ("Decree"). In the Decree, the
First Judicial District Court, Broadwater County, decreed the water
rights of Confederate Creek and its tributaries to the predecessors in
interest to Hidden Hollow Ranch ("Hidden Hollow") and Gregory W.
Field ("Field") on September 24, 1940.
Pursuant to the rights established in the Decree, Field's lower diversion was prior to Hidden Hollow's points of diversion. Consequently, very little water bypassed Field's lower point of diversion and
traveled toward Hidden Hollow's points of diversion. This led to a
number of incidents between Field and Hidden Hollow, which included Hidden Hollow's attempt to alter Field's diversion structure,
Hidden Hollow's manipulation of the Field's valve, and Field's installation of an improved diversion structure and padlock. Hidden Hollow
eventually filed an action against Field, in which Hidden Hollow
sought to hold Field in contempt for violating the Decree and enjoin
Field from further interference with Hidden Hollow's water rights.
Following a bench trial, the FirstJudicial District Court, Broadwater
County dismissed Hidden Hollow's petition and enjoined it from further interference with Field's diversion works and water conveyance
system. Hidden Hollow appealed the district court's decision to the
Montana Supreme Court. Hidden Hollow raised four primary issues
on appeal.
The court first addressed Hidden Hollow's argument that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction and re-adjudicated the parties' underlying water rights as previously decreed in the Decree. According
to Hidden Hollow, the district court re-adjudicated the water rights by
recognizing the existence of an independent source of water and determined the source's flow rate. The court rejected Hidden Hollow's
argument. The court noted district courts have the authority to supervise the distribution of previously adjudicated water, enforce an existing water decree, and fill in pre-1973 decrees with further delineations.
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The district court's recognition of an independent source of water,
determination of the flow rate, and referral to the water at issue as developed water fell under this authority. Thus, the district court did not
exceed its jurisdiction..
Hidden Hollow also argued the district court erred in denying
Hidden Hollow's motion to certify the issue involving the controversy
as to the source of the respective parties' water rights to the chief water
judge. The court rejected Hidden Hollow's argument, relying again
on the determination that the district court did not exceed its jurisdiction in respect to the previous issue.
Next, the court addressed the argument that the district court erroneously shifted the burden of proof to Hidden Hollow to prove how
much water Hidden Hollow contributed to the natural drainage from
its independent source. The court stated the burden of proof rests on
the party asserting he or she is entitled to use water released into a
natural carrier from another water source. In the case at issue, the
court noted the district court weighed the evidence presented at trial
and concluded Field proved more water was imported from his water
source than the water diverted at his lower point of diversion. On the
other hand, Hidden Hollow's evidence was not as persuasive. Thus,
the district court permissibly shifted the burden of proof to Hidden
Hollow.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the district court's
order regarding Hidden Hollow's water right deprived Hidden Hollow
of due process of law by ruling on issues not raised by the pleadings.
On this issue, Hidden Hollow maintained the district court permanently modified the Decree by declaring Field was entitled to all but a
0.83 miner's inches of water at his lower point of diversion. Hidden
Hollow argued that such a modification, in what was essentially an action for contempt and injunctive relief, deprived Hidden Hollow of
due process of law. However, the court held the district court did not
permanently modify the Decree, thus the district court did not deprive
Hidden Hollow of procedural and substantive protections embodied
by the due process clauses of the United States Constitution and the
Montana Constitution.
In conclusion, the court rejected all of Hidden Hollow's arguments
and affirmed the district court's holding.
Benjamin M. Petre
Paulson v. Flathead Conservation Dist., 91 P.3d 569 (Mont. 2004)
(holding the conservation district had statutory authority to determine
property owners' rights to construct a waterfront improvement project
where another state agency had concurrent jurisdiction over the project).

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

Jack and Donna Paulson ("the Paulsons") applied for and received
a permit from the Flathead Regional Development Office ("FRDO") to
construct a waterfront project ("project") on Flathead Lake. Five
months into the project's construction, the Flathead Conservation District ("FCD") notified the Paulsons the project was also in the Swan
River and, therefore, subject to FCD'sjurisdiction. Upon receiving this
notice, the Paulsons petitioned FCD for a permit, which FCD denied.
The Paulsons thereafter sought to determine whether FRDO or FCD
had jurisdiction over the project. An arbitration panel ("panel") determined the project was located on a flowing stream and the FCD
therefore had jurisdiction over the project. The panel's decision also
necessarily upheld FCD's denial of the Paulsons' permit petition. As a
result, the Paulsons filed a motion in the Flathead County District
Court to vacate the panel's decision.
The Paulsons contended the dispute involved ajurisdictional issue
between administrative agencies that the court needed to decide the
issue. The Paulsons also questioned the legitimacy of appointing a
former state agency official to the panel. Specifically, the Paulsons argued a former Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks
("FWP") employee could not be an impartial arbiter. The district
court granted FCD's motion for judgment on the pleadings and the
Paulsons appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
The Paulsons asserted the question of whether FCD or FRDO had
proper jurisdiction was properly decided by the district court, not an
arbitration panel. FCD contended it could make determinations of
water status and that its internal arbitration panel had the authority to
review FCD decisions in order to resolve all factual and legal issues arising from disputes. Montana generally gives arbitrators broad authority
to decide both legal and factual questions, and courts uphold such
decisions upon review if the decisions are rationally derived from the
agreement to arbitrate. The agreement to arbitrate, in this case, called
for review by an arbitration panel if a party was unsatisfied. However,
state law severely limited judicial review of the arbitration decision.
In this instance, the test laid out in Bitterroot River Prot. Ass'n v. Bitterroot ConservationDist. applied. The Bitterroot test stated for a court to
interfere with an agency's determination of its jurisdiction: (1) the
agency's jurisdiction must be plainly lacking, (2) forcing a party to exhaust its remedies must result in irreparable injury, and (3) the
agency's special expertise must be of no help on the question of jurisdiction. The court ruled FCD's jurisdiction was not plainly lacking
because it was logical for the agency involved to determine what constituted a stream. The court also concluded that requiring the Paulsons
to exhaust administrative remedies would not result in irreparable injury. Finally, FCD's expertise was not without value, as FCD and FRDO
asserted concurrent jurisdiction over Flathead Lake throughout the
history of the agencies. For these reasons, the court held the arbitra-
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tion panel did not abuse its power and it had the proper authorization
to make the decisions regarding the Paulsons' permit.
Next, the court determined a former employee of a state agency is
not automatically barred from serving as an arbitrator in a case where
the same agency is a party. As long as the individual was a resident of
the judicial district in which the arbitration occurred and the judge
chose the individual from the lists of potential arbiters submitted by
FWP, FCD, and the permit applicant, then the person could be an arbitrator. The former FWP employee that served as an arbitrator in this
case met both of these conditions. Additionally, the court had previously held prior employment was insufficient to establish partiality per
se. The Paulsons' argument of partiality was therefore speculative and
conclusory at best.
Thus, the arbitration panel had the statutory authority to make
permit determinations, was impartial in making its decision, and provided adequate remedies for permit application review. For these reasons, the court upheld the ruling of the district court not to vacate the
arbitration panel's decision.
John Lintzenich
NEBRASKA
In re Applications T-851 and T-852, 686 N.W.2d 360 (Neb. 2004) (holding the Department of Natural Resources properly reduced the allocation of incidental groundwater storage rights in proportion to a decrease in state power district's direct irrigation service).
The Nebraska Public Power District ("NPPD") filed applications
with the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") concerning two of
NPPD's water appropriations. The NPPD filed the applications after
one of its water users, Terry Crawford, ceased use of NPPD's surface
water and began irrigating his land with well water. NPPD's applications requested a transfer of the location of diversion and use of two of
NPPD's water appropriation rights. NPPD believed the transfer was
necessary in order to avoid losing the water rights associated with
Crawford's land. The DNR approved the transfer for one application.
However, with respect to the second appropriation, the DNR cancelled
0.65 cubic feet per second ("cfs") of the NPPD's incidental groundwater storage allocation. The NPPD appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
The DNR based its decision on language from a May 1988 order
("order") that originally granted water appropriation rights to the
NPPD, but also stipulated that a proportionate reduction in incidental
underground storage would accompany any reduction in direct irrigation service. Based on the terms of the order, the DNR concluded
Crawford's decision not to use the direct irrigation service consequently reduced the NPPD's direct irrigation service. Thus, pursuant
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to the stipulations of the order, the DNR proportionally reduced
NPPD's allocation of incidental underground water.
NPPD appealed the DNR's decision, arguing the cancellation of
0.65 cfs violated Nebraska's constitution and state law. However, the
court concluded, because NPPD failed to appeal the order, the order
became binding. Thus, NPPD's argument was a collateral attack on a
final agency decision and the court accordingly had no authority to
review whether the order violated the state constitution or state law.
NPPD also argued the DNR improperly applied the order's proportional reduction condition by interpreting the term "service" contrary
to the court's interpretation in In re Application U-2. Specifically, NPPD
claimed water from the canals that provided water for NPPD's direct
irrigation service naturally seeped into, and mixed with, groundwater,
thereby recharging Crawford's wells. NPPD thus argued that because
the water that filled Crawford's wells originated from the same source
that provided NPPD's direct irrigation water, Crawford's land remained part of NPPD's service.
The court, however, determined it did not need to interpret the
term "service," but needed to interpret the order's use of the entire
phrase "direct irrigation service." Because the DNR relied on a Nebraska statute when calculating the original grant of water rights, the
court concluded the statute's definition of "direct irrigation service"
was dispositive. The statute defined "direct irrigation service" as irrigation from the natural flow of streams, which referred only to surface
water irrigation, not underground water storage. Thus, pursuant to
the Nebraska statute, when Crawford ceased using direct irrigation
service and began using well water, such nonuse reduced NPPD's service. Based on the language of the order and the statutory definition
of "direct irrigation service," the court upheld the DNR's decision to
cancel 0.65 cfs of the NPPD's groundwater rights as a result of the reduction in NPPD's direct irrigation service.
Kathryn Garner
NEW MEXICO
Hanson v. Turney, 94 P.3d 1 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (holding the New
Mexico statute distinguished between a vested water right and a permit
to appropriate waters, a vested water right arose only after the application of waters to a beneficial use and only vested water rights could be
transferred).
Mabel Hanson ("Hanson"), the holder of two permits for the appropriation of groundwater, appealed the New Mexico State Engineer's ("State Engineer") decision denying Hanson's application that
requested a transfer of the type of the use designated in the permit
from irrigation to subdivision use. Pursuant to state law, the holder of
the water right can file an application with the State Engineer request-
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ing a transfer of either the type or place of use for all water rights under the administrative control of the State Engineer's office. The State
Engineer determined that a permit to appropriate water only constituted the first step toward securing the water right and a water right
vested only after beneficial use occurred. Hanson never placed the
allocated water to beneficial use; therefore, the State Engineer denied
the transfer application due to the lack of any transferable water right.
A State Engineer Hearing Officer agreed with the State Engineer and
upheld the denial of the transfer application. On appeal for review of
the agency decision, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the State Engineer dismissing Hanson's action for relief. The
New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court.
In upholding the denial of the transfer application, the appellate
court looked at the relevant state statutes for a definition of a water
right. The statutes and legislative history provided no explicit definition of a water right; however, over a century of common-law precedent held a water right vested only after the application of the water to
beneficial use. Additionally, the court reasoned the legislature intended to differentiate between a water right and a permit to appropriate water by the statutory language that provided for the forfeiture
of both water rights and permits to appropriate where the specified
waters were not placed to a beneficial use in a reasonable time. Further, a prior decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court limited the
ability of a water right holder to transfer that right only within the limits of the amount of water the water right holder historically used. The
appellate court agreed with the State Engineer in that Hanson possessed no valid water right eligible for transfer.
Alternatively, Hanson claimed that prior inconsistent application of
the above listed rule estopped the State Engineer from now denying
the transfer application in question. Hanson presented evidence that
the State Engineer's office in the past approved applications for the
transfer of type or location of use for certain permittees while rejecting
similar applications for a lack of previous beneficial use. The appellate
court determined that the state policy strongly discouraged the application of equitable estoppel to State Engineer decisions concerning
the allocation of the state's water resources. The court further limited
estoppel claims as nonrecoverable where the correct application of
state law directly contradicted the desired relief. Finally, Hanson never
claimed a deliberate misrepresentation by the State Engineer or detrimental reliance on the part of Hanson as required for a valid estoppel
claim. The appellate court stated the prior inconsistent treatment of
transfer applications for permittees by the State Engineer could not
alone establish the pattern of shocking behavior by a state agency
needed to support an estoppel claim against the state government.
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The appellate court determined that neither a stay in discovery
granted by the district court nor the extensive delays by both the State
Engineer and the district court in ruling on the transfer application,
resulted in a due process violation, as Hanson claimed. Further, the
court noted Hanson presented no authority to demonstrate the possibility of prevailing on the merits had the court found a due process
violation.
In affirming the district court's ruling, the appellate court agreed
with the lower court's decision that permits to appropriate water were
only the first step in securing a water right and therefore not eligible
for a transfer in place or type of intended use.
Sean 1 Biddle
Herrington v. Office of the State Eng'r, 92 P.3d 31 (N.M. Ct. App.
2004) (holding application to change point of diversion for a surface
water right from an aboveground water location to well did not satisfy
two-pronged requirement pursuant to state law).
Ellis and Laverne Herrington ("Herringtons") owned a right to divert 49.73 acre feet of water per year from the Rio de Arenas. The
Herringtons' historical point of diversion was the Frazier-Bateman
Ditch ("Frazier"). In 1982, the Herringtons filed an application to
change their point of diversion to a downstream 100-foot-deep well,
arguing that upstream groundwater pumped by junior appropriators
diminished the available surface water at Frazier. Following a denial
from the Office of the State Engineer, the district court denied the
Herringtons' application as well. The Herringtons appealed to the
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
New Mexico law allows an individual with surface water rights to
change the water right's point of diversion to a well in times of shortage provided: (1) the groundwater is a source of the surface flow at the
point of surface diversion, and (2) the change in point of diversion
does not impair existing water rights. The first prong hinges on
whether the water drawn from the proposed well would, if not drawn,
reach the historical point of diversion. As a matter of logic, a downstream well, as proposed by the Herringtons, would not meet this requirement. A downstream groundwater well, by design, draws on
seepage and percolation occurring after the original surface water diversion. Thus, the seepage and percolation was not a source of the
surface water that the Herringtons had a right. Therefore, the court
affirmed the denial of the well. Because the Herringtons did not satisfy
the first prong of the test, the court did not consider the second prong.
Additionally, the Herringtons argued they had an independent
right to change their point of diversion to a groundwater well even if
they did not satisfy the aforementioned two-prong test. The Herringtons claimed the right to change the point of diversion was an incident
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of ownership and the two-prong test only applied when the water right
owner wished to apply the priority date of the surface water right to the
groundwater well. The court rejected this theory and held the twoprong requirement applied to all surface to groundwater transfers.
The court further rejected the Herringtons' claim that the court
needed to conform the groundwater application to satisfy the twoprong requirements, citing the unreasonable burden such a requirement places on the Office of the State Engineer. The Court thus affirmed all of the trial court's holdings.
Aimee Wagstaff
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control
Comm'n, 94 P.3d 788 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (holding New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission correctly adopted revised water quality
standards).
The New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission ("Commission") adopted revisions to the state's water quality standards necessary
to comply with state and federal laws and regulations in response to a
warning issued by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). In
accordance with proper procedure, the Commission unanimously
adopted the amended standards after a hearing where the Regents of
the University of California ("Regents"), along with other parties, submitted only written testimony. After the Commission subsequently
issued an order and statement of reasons for adopting the amendment,
the Regents appealed the adoption of the sentence, "the discharge or
presence of which in the affected waters could reasonably be expected
to interfere with those designated uses adopted by the State, as necessary to support such designated uses."
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of New Mexico, the Regents
first argued the Commission did not provide an adequate statement of
reasons for adopting the revised standard. However, the court held
the Commission provided an adequate statement of the reasons, finding the more than 1000-page statement to be thorough and comprehensive. The statement provided the court with the ability to determine the basis for the Commission's adoption of the regulations. The
court further reasoned the statement was adequate, because the statement explained how the new standards protected public health and
welfare, enhanced the quality New Mexico's waters, respected the use
and value of water, and met EPA guidelines.
Next, the Regents argued the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), or alternatively New Mexico's Water Quality Act ("WQA"), required the Commission to designate a fishery use for ephemeral tributaries before
adopting human health standards. The court held the Commission's
failure to designate fishery uses for ephemeral tributaries before adopting human health standards for those tributaries did not violate the
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WQA or the CWA. The court reasoned that nothing in the statutes
prohibited the Commission from applying higher standards to tributaries to protect waters with fishery uses. Moreover, the court held the
standard did not regulate effluent. The court further reasoned the
standard limited regulation to water quality, and noted the distinction
between overall water quality standards and setting effluent limits.
Finally, the Regents asserted the Commission's action was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and was arbitrary and
capricious. The court ruled substantial evidence within the whole record supported the Commission's action. Moreover, the court held
the Commission's action was not arbitrary or capricious because, regardless of the availability of other alternatives, the Commission's decision was not irrational, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Commission's adoption of revised
water quality standards.
Alexandra Farkouh
OREGON
Hannigan v. Hinton, 97 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding water
rights appurtenant to a mining right were subject to forfeiture because
use of water at a location different than the one designated on water
rights certificate did not constitute a use under the forfeiture statute).
In 1987, the Hannigans purchased mining claims and appurtenant
water rights to water flowing in the Pete Mann Ditch ("Ditch"). The
Water Resources Department ("Department") alleged nonuse at the
certificates' designated place from 1979 to 1986, as the previous water
rights owner did not use water at the Ditch during those years. The
water in the Ditch ran near an area called Parkerville where the Hannigans also owned mining rights. However, the water rights certificate
for the Ditch did not designate Parkerville as an area of use. The Department found the Hannigans forfeited their water rights because,
under the relevant forfeiture statute, an owner of a perfected water
right forfeits his\her rights when he\she fails to use all or part of the
water appropriated for a period of five successive years.
The Hannigans sought review of the Department's final order canceling the Hannigans' water rights in the Oregon Court of Appeals.
The Hannigans first argued Oregon's forfeiture statute did not apply
to water rights designated for mining. The Hannigans argued Oregon's mining statute granting appurtenant water rights was subject
only to the provisions of the Oregon Water Rights Act ("Act"). The Act
specifically encompassed other statutes, but did not include forfeiture.
As such, the Hannigans argued the appropriate standard was the
common law doctrine of abandonment, which required proof of intent
to abandon. The court noted that portions of the Act, to which mining
water rights were clearly subject, incorporated the limitations of the
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forfeiture statute. Under the Act, all water rights seekers needed to
apply for a permit and obtain a certificate. Since the forfeiture statute
applied to those permits, the court reasoned all permitted water rights,
including those for mining, were subject to the statute as well. Thus,
the court concluded the forfeiture statute also applied to the mining
water rights.
The Hannigans next argued that even if the statute applied, the
use of water at Parkerville during the relevant period should satisfy the
term "use" under the statute. The court determined "place of use" was
a component of "use" for the purposes of forfeiture because water
rights were appurtenant to specific parcels of land. The court further
reasoned the right to use water connected to the location of the perfection of the water right, the place named on the certificate. Additionally, the Department provided a procedure for water rights holders
to apply to change places of use, but the Hannigans failed to go
through that approval process. Accordingly, the court determined that
to avoid forfeiture under the statute, a holder must use water in the
place designated on the certificate. After finding substantial evidence
to support the Department's decision, the court affirmed the final
judgment of the Department canceling the Hannigans' water rights
due to of nonuse.
Story Washburn
WaterWatch, Inc. v. Water Res. Comm'n, 88 P.3d 327 (Or. Ct. App.
2004) (holding municipalities must adhere to the five-year construction requirements of Oregon's water law statute).
The Coos Bay North Bend Water Board ("CBNB") applied to the
Water Resources Department ("Department") in March 1990 for a
permit to appropriate water from Tenmile Creek. CBNB also submitted four water demand forecasts projecting growth and water needs
through 2050. The Department issued a proposed final order in December 1997 that approved the permit with conditions. WaterWatch
of Oregon, Inc. ("WaterWatch") filed protests claiming the water demand forecasts showed the CBNB included plans for water that would
not go into effect until 2050. The Oregon Water Resources Commission ("Commission") held a contested case proceeding and approved
the permit as well as the third forecast. The forecast predicted that by
2050, the CBNB needed 3 million gallons of water per day at a diversion rate of 4.6 cubic feet per second ("cfs") and included an additional 18.6 cfs for a potential industrial user. The Commission granted
the permit, allowing the CBNB to withdraw water at a maximum rate of
23.2 cfs. WaterWatch appealed to the Court of Appeals of Oregon to
contest the order.
The court first analyzed the issue of standing. Since the water law
statutes had more specific judicial review provisions than the general
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review provisions of Oregon's Administrative Procedures Act, the court
determined the water law statutes controlled. The pertinent statute
required the person or group is a party affected by a final order. WaterWatch filed a timely protest against the proposed order and, thus
satisfied met the statutory requirements to qualify as a party. To determine if WaterWatch was an affected party, the court looked at the
legislative intent and whom the proposed final order would positively
or negatively affect. The court determined three groups of persons
that could be parties to a contested case proceeding: the applicant; a
person who requested standing or supported the proposed final order;
and a person who protested the proposed final order. In its protest,
WaterWatch indicated it represented the public and included how the
proposed final order adversely affected its interests in instream rights
of Tenmile Creek. The court ruled that because WaterWatch included
specifics in its protest, including time, money, and effort spent to create an instream water right in Tenmile Creek, and because the permit
would affect this right, WaterWatch demonstrated standing.
In addition to standing, WaterWatch needed to demonstrate it satisfied constitutional justiciability requirements by showing the Commission's decision would practically affect its rights. In its protest, WaterWatch explained the CBNB would have an earlier priority date than
any instream right, making any instream rights subject to CBNB's use.
This later priority would significantly diminish WaterWatch's investment in the instream rights in Tenmile Creek. WaterWatch also provided several affidavits from its own members to show that the issuance
of the permit detrimentally affected their own use and enjoyment. For
these reasons, the court concluded WaterWatch satisfied the justiciability requirements.
To defeat the proposed final order, the court stated the record
must show CBNB's plan violated one or more of the criteria in the water law statute or the proposed use would be detrimental to the public
interest. The statute set a timeline for the perfection of a water right
that required actual construction begin within one year from the date
of the application approval, the construction shall be pursued with due
diligence and completed within a reasonable time, and that time shall
not exceed five years. There was an exception to the five year limitation: for good cause shown or if governmental requirements relating to
the project significantly delayed completion. The Commission described CBNB's plan and determined that the earliest date for perfection of the right was 2025. The Commission approved this plan based
on the CBNB proceeding with due diligence. The court rejected this
argument because the statute imposes a five-year limit on due diligence
by requiring construction to finish in five years.
The CBNB argued that applications for municipal uses should receive special consideration due to the significant and substantial differences from other uses. Therefore, the five-year limit was only a
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guideline. The court disagreed, stating the Oregon's water law required that water was appropriated for beneficial use in a timely manner. The text of the statute exempted municipal uses from the one
year start time, but applied the five year limit to all diversions. The
court found no municipal exemption for the completion requirement
existed in the statute. The CBNB argued it could get an extension for
good cause shown, however, the text stated extensions only apply after
the issuance of a permit and after delays occur. The CBNB also argued
if it was in the public interest for CBNB to obtain the permit for municipal use, the permit should be issued regardless of the statutory
terms. The court held that because the statute did not allow for this,
the five year restriction still applied.
For the reasons above, the court concluded the CBNB could not
exercise due diligence in the construction of the diversion and that the
Commission erred as a matter of law. The court reversed the Commission's decision and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings.
Kathleen Booth

SOUTH CAROLINA
Lucas v. Rawl Family Ltd., 598 S.E.2d 712 (S.C. 2004) (holding the
common enemy rule applies regardless of a landowner's intent to
cause a nuisance to an adjacent, lower landowner's property).
Franklin Lucas brought action against adjacent landowner Rawl
Family Limited Partnership ("Rawl") in the Lexington County Court
for negligence, trespass, and nuisance. Lucas sought damages for repeated flooding to his land that resulted after Rawl cut down trees and
removed stumps from forty acres of the land in order to prepare the
land for farming. Rawl's land sat at a higher elevation than Lucas'
land. Water naturally flowed from Rawl's land onto Lucas' land. After
Rawl cleared the land, Lucas' land flooded after every heavy rain, preventing Lucas from growing crops.
The trial court granted Rawl a directed verdict for negligence, but
allowed the jury to consider the trespass and nuisance claims. The jury
rejected the trespass claim, but awarded damages to Lucas for nuisance. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
trial court should have entered a directed verdict for Rawl on the nuisance claim because the common enemy rule did not apply. The court
of appeals found that the common enemy rule only applied when
landowners take "direct action" regarding surface water on their properties that obstruct or alter natural flow and, as a result, harm adjoining landowners. Rawl had no intent to influence the natural flow of
the surface water because Rawl cleared the land only in preparation for
farming, not to alter the flow of surface water. Thus, the court of ap-
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peals concluded that without intent to alter the surface water's natural
course, the common enemy rule did not apply.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found two errors in the
court of appeals' ruling. First, the court of appeals erred in addressing
whether the common enemy rule applied. Appellate courts are restricted to determining issues raised and ruled upon by the trial court.
Neither party appealed the trial court's ruling that the common enemy
rule applied, so the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to consider
the issue. Second, the court of appeals erred in holding that the
common enemy rule merely extended the common law rule. The
court held that according to case law, the common enemy rule and the
common law rule were the same rule.
Additionally, the court ruled that a directed verdict on the issue of
nuisance was not appropriate. The test for nuisance, the court held,
was whether the nuisance had become "dangerous at all times and under all circumstances to life, health, or property." Because Lucas' land
flooded in every heavy rain and he was unable to grow crops on a portion of his land, ample evidence existed for a jury to decide whether
Rawl's actions amounted to a nuisance per se.
In dissent, Justice Pleicones stated the common enemy rule applies,
but that nuisance per se did not exist. To find nuisance, he argued,
evidence that the surface water accumulated, rather than merely ran
from higher land onto adjacent lower land, needed to be present. Justice Pleicones found Lucas' situation to lack such evidence and characterized the situation as damnum absque injuia-not caused by a wrongful act. Justice Pleicones also found that Rawl's clearing of his land for
farming did not amount to nuisance per se.
Because the court's majority concluded that the court of appeals
erred in determining that the common enemy rule did not apply and
the trial court was correct in refusing to issue a directed verdict on the
nuisance claim. The court upheld the jury award of damages for nuisance.
Kathtyn Garner
SOUTH DAKOTA
First Lady, LLC. v.JMF Props., LLC, 681 N.W.2d 94 (S.D. 2004) (holding both the civil use rule and the reasonable use rule for water drainage required a test of reasonableness).
Both First Lady Motel ("First Lady") and JMF Properties, L.L.C.
("Tramway") were located at the base of a 300-foot mountain in Keystone, South Dakota. Originally built in 1991, First Lady sat at the base
of the mountain. Tramway, originally built in 1965, was situated adjacent and above First Lady. In 1997, First Lady built a retaining wall
around its property leaving a steep embankment directly behind the
wall. First Lady also created a berm on Tramway's property by piling
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dirt and debris left from the construction of the retaining wall. Three
years later, Tramway began making improvements on its property. To
prevent excessive erosion and vegetation loss, Tramway made crosscuts, rolling dips, and hump swales across the road leading to its property. When heavy rains caused water and silt to run downhill and over
the retaining wall towards First Lady, First Lady filed suit against
Tramway claiming nuisance and requesting abatement of the nuisance.
The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit entered judgment for
First Lady and required Tramway to abate the nuisance. Tramway appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court.
First Lady had to prove Tramway's acts constituted a nuisance. Furthermore, First Lady did not claim Tramway acted unlawfully. Instead,
First Lady needed to prove Tramway failed to perform a duty. In order
to determine whether Tramway failed to perform their legally required
duties, the court began with an analysis of South Dakota's drainage
law. Under South Dakota's civil law rule, property owners may drain
water from their properties to natural or established watercourses and
natural depressions. Under the reasonable use rule, a property owner
may alter surface water flow so long as the alteration is reasonable.
Although South Dakota codified the civil law rule with respect to water
drainage, most courts apply the reasonable use rule when dealing with
urban drainage of surface water. Because the trial court did not clearly
state which drainage rule it applied when requiring Tramway to abate
the nuisance, the court considered both the civil law rule and reasonable use rule.
The court previously stated that drainage under the civil law rule
was conditioned upon accomplishing natural drainage without unreasonably injuring neighboring properties. Therefore, under both the
civil law rule and under the reasonable use rule, Tramway could legally
drain its property subject so long as its actions were reasonable. Because reasonableness was a question of fact and the trial court did not
consider any findings of fact related to natural discharge or the reasonableness of Tramway's actions, the court reversed and remanded
the trial court's decision to reconsider the evidence in light of the reasonable test.
Aimee Wagstaff
TEXAS
Herrmann v. Lindsey, 136 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding: (1)
the contract to sell land was illegal because it reserved to seller more
than one-half the irrigation pumping rights in violation of state law,
which required one-half the irrigation pumping rights remain with the
land; (2) where seller of land who owned irrigation pumping rights
entered into an illegal contract with purchaser of land, purchaser was
entitled to deed reformation; and (3) affirmative contract defenses did
not apply).
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Ronald J. Herrmann and Karen H. Herrmann ("the Herrmanns")
owned a tract of land and the rights to an application for an irrigation
water pumping permit associated with the land. Before arranging to
sell the land, the Herrmanns transferred their permit application
rights to a company they owned in two separate transactions, transferring one-half of the rights with each transaction. The Herrmanns then
contracted to convey the land to Glenn Lindsey. Under the contract,
the Herrmanns reserved the permit application rights by excluding
them from the sale.
The Edwards Aquifer Authority Act ("the Act") permitted the
Herrmanns to sever from the land only one-half of the irrigation
pumping rights. The Act referred to these rights as "unrestricted irrigation groundwater." Under the Act, the Herrmanns could not sever
from the land the other one-half of the irrigation pumping rights, referred to as "base irrigation groundwater." The Herrmanns sued
Lindsey in the District Court of Medina County, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the transfer of the base irrigation groundwater was legal, and Lindsey countersued. Lindsey motioned the trial court for
summary judgment, asserting land ownership entitled him to one-half
the irrigation pumping rights. The trial court granted Lindsey's motion and reformed his warranty deed to reserve to the Herrmanns onehalf the permit application rights.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Texas, the Herrmanns argued that Lindsey did not possess a valid claim of title to the water
rights, because Lindsey never obtained a valid title to the land since
the parties did not agree to transfer any water rights. The court explained that the water reservation formed a material aspect of the conveyance, the issue turned on whether Lindsey was entitled to deed reformation to reflect a one-half pumping rights reservation. According
to Texas law, where only part of an executed contract is illegal, courts
refuse to enforce the illegal provisions but allow the remaining provisions "to stand as executed." Here, the Act required that the base irrigation groundwater rights remain with the landowner, but the deed
was an otherwise valid conveyance. Therefore, the court found
Lindsey was entitled to reformation of the deed.
The Herrmanns raised two contract law affirmative defenses. The
court explained that contract rules no longer applied, because the
contract no longer existed; Lindsey paid the consideration and the
Herrmanns delivered the deed. Additionally, the court explained that
the Herrmanns could not raise contract defenses because a party to a
fully-executed illegal contract cannot ask the court to enforce or set
aside a transaction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Elizabeth Frost
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Watts v. Texas, 140 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding: (1) the trial
court accurately instructed thejury that a dry drainage ditch constituted "water in the state", (2) the trial court erred in defining "water
in the state" as other means than those in the statutory definition, and
(3) the trial court's jury instruction harmed the defendant).
John Watts ("Watts") released sewage into a dry trench 140 to 150
feet from a county drainage ditch that ultimately emptied into Buffalo
Bayou and Galveston Bay. Watts was charged with discharging a pollutant adjacent to "water in the state" and knowingly discharging sewage adjacent to "water in the state." Watts was convicted in the Harris
County Criminal Court on two counts of water pollution for discharging raw sewage adjacent to "water in the state" in violation of the Texas
Water Code. The trial court held the drainage ditch constituted "water
in the state" and instructed the jury that a drainage ditch was one of
the types of surface water the legislature sought to protect under the
Water Code Act.
Watts appealed the conviction. The Texas Court of Appeals approved the trial court's instruction and affirmed the judgment. Watts
then petitioned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which held
the jury instruction was improper, reversed the judgment, and remanded the case to the Texas Court of Appeals for rehearing.
On rehearing, the court held the trial court's instruction accurately
defined the drainage ditch as "water in the state." Since the legislature
included the beds and banks of all watercourses in its definition of "water in the state," Watts' dry trench fell under the statutory definition.
The court found the trial court's instruction correctly stated the law,
because one may pollute the bed of a watercourse or drainage ditch
regardless of whether it contains water.
While the court found the jury instruction accurately stated the
law, the court deferred to the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding that
the trial court erred in giving any instruction defining "water in the
state" in terms other than those used by the legislature. The Court of
Criminal Appeals held the trial court improperly instructed the jury
regarding its own judicial decision that the drainage ditch was "water
in the state" and the Texas Court of Appeals agreed.
The court further evaluated whether the jury instruction, though
accurate, harmed Watts. While the court found a drainage ditch was
"water in the state" as a matter of law, it held the trial court's instruction harmed Watts because, without the instruction, his counsel might
have convinced the jury otherwise. The court held the instruction
harmful regarding both the charge of discharging a pollutant adjacent
to "water in the state" and the charge for knowingly discharging sewage
adjacent to "water in the state."
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After rehearing the case, and finding the jury instruction regarding
"water in the state" harmed Watts, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
Meredith Ginn
UTAH
In re General Determination of the Rights to Use All of the Water, 98
P.3d 1 (Utah 2004) (affirming district court ruling granting summary
judgment and holding: (1) a single water user cannot claim more water than he can beneficially use, nor can he claim for himself water
beneficially used by others; and (2) under appropriate circumstances,
the use of water to irrigate natural vegetation can constitute a beneficial use).
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Company ("PPOC") operated and
maintained a pipeline that provided water to residents of the Pinecrest
community. Prior to PPOC's incorporation, property owners managed
by LeRoy Meyer ("Meyer") undertook construction of the pipeline doing business as the Pinecrest Water Users Association ("PWUA").
Meyer contacted an official from the State Engineer's office regarding
the pipeline system and the water being used by the homes connected
to the line. He also applied for water rights associated with the line.
The State Engineer published the proposed determination of water
rights recommending Water User's Claim ("WUC") 57-8492 transfer to
PPOC as successors in interest to the PWUA. Meyer brought suit in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake claiming he filed WUC 57-8492 on his
own behalf, therefore the water rights belonged to him personally.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of PPOC, dismissing
Meyer's claim to the water rights.
Meyer appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, maintaining he filed
the WUC without the PWUA's knowledge or direction and with the
intention of reserving the right for himself. PPOC cross-appealed a
decision from a separate proceeding, holding Butler, Crockett & Walsh
Development Corporation ("BCWNDC"), Meyer's predecessors in interest, did not forfeit WUC 57-3442.
The Utah Supreme Court identified three reasons why the lower
court properly dismissed Meyer's claim. First, Meyer failed to object to
the State Engineer's proposed determination within the statutory period of ninety days as proscribed by statute. Meyer signed a receipt and
waiver of service of the State Engineer's proposed determination in
March 1994 and it, therefore, barred him from contesting the disposition of WUJC 57-8492. Second, because a water user's appropriations
are limited to the amount the user puts to beneficial use, no one can
acquire the right to use more water than is necessary to satisfy his beneficial requirements. Meyer's claim of sole ownership to WUC 57-8492
failed because he could not claim more water than he could benefi-
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cially use, nor could he claim for himself water beneficially used by
others. Finally, when filing for WUC 57-8492, Meyer selected PWUA
c/o LeRoy Meyer as the petitioner for the water right. Meyer claimed
this was his personal d/b/a, however, the court determined this was
blatantly incompatible with PPOC's records where the property owners
association referred to itself as the PWUA.
With respect to the cross-appeal, PPOC claimed the trial court
erred by: (1) finding BCWDC actively used water for irrigation during
the alleged forfeiture period, (2) giving weight to the State Engineer's
proposed determination identifying BCWDC as owner of WUC 573442, and (3) determining BCWDC beneficially used the water. The
court confirmed that watering indigenous vegetation was generally not
a beneficial use and may be wasteful, but stated the determination relied on individual facts and circumstances. Here, however, because
BCWCD cultivated plants, harvested berries, and gifted trees, the irrigation of natural vegetation constituted a beneficial use. Additionally,
since the trial judge personally inspected BCWDC's property and
found sufficient evidence of irrigation, the court concluded the trial
court did not give undue weight to the State Engineer's proposed determination, and affirmed the trial court's ruling that BCWCD did not
forfeit rights to WUC 57-3442.
In conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment regarding ownership of WUC 57-8492, because
Meyer's failed to file a timely objection; Meyer could not claim more
water than he could beneficially use; and as an individual user, he
could not claim for himself water beneficially used by others. The
court also affirmed the trial court's ruling that BCWDC did not forfeit
its water rights under WUC 57-3442, because PPOC failed to establish
forfeiture of water for a continuous five-year period.
CharlesP. Kersch,Jr.
WASHINGTON
Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 90 P.3d 659 (Wash.
2004) (holding: (1) the Pollution Control Hearings Board ("PCHB")
was within its authority to impose conditions on the section 401 certification when those conditions are necessary to reach reasonable assurance that water quality standards will be met; (2) PCHB should review
all relevant information when evaluating section 401 certification regardless of whether that information was submitted prior or subsequent to the original grant of the certification; (3) PCHB reliance on
future information is not only permitted, but necessary in light of the
predictive nature of section 401 certification; (4) mitigation is only
required to the level at which the environment is affected; (5) mitigation plans that use stormwater to maintain existing flow levels are considered "stormwater management" and does not require a water right;
(6) Chapter 210 is not unconstitutional special legislation, and was
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intended to be retroactively enforced; (7) the Synthetic Precipitation
Leaching Procedure does not conflict with the Clean Water Act; (8)
Water Effects Ratio studies may be used to tighten or relax water quality standards; (9) a degraded wetland can be restored; (10) in-basin
mitigation options need not be exhausted before considering out-ofbasin alternatives; (11) PCHB is within its rights to exclude irrelevant
testimony; and (12) PCHB must only include evidence if its exclusion
would prejudice the PCHB's opinion).
The Port of Seattle's ("Port") plan for the construction of a third
runway at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport ("SeaTac") included
placing fill in adjacent wetlands. In October 2000 the Port submitted a
joint aquatic resource permit application ("JARPA") to the Army Corps
of Engineers ("Corps") and to the Washington State Department of
Ecology ("Ecology"), pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
The Port's JARPA also constituted an application to Ecology for certification that the Port's plan complies with applicable water quality laws,
as required by section 401 of the Clean Water Act. Ecology granted
section 401 certification in September 2001, and the Airport Communities Coalition, with intervener Coalition Against SeaTac Expansion
(collectively "Citizens Groups"), appealed this decision to the Pollution
Control Hearings Board ("PCHB"). PCHB affirmed the section 401
certification and added 16 new conditions it deemed necessary to meet
the reasonable assurance standard of the certification. Ecology, the
Port, and the Citizens Groups all filed petitions for judicial review of
the ruling. At the urging of the parties, their requests were consolidated and the case appeared before the Washington Supreme Court.
In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting authorities of Ecology
and PCHB, the court ruled that PCHB may add conditions to a section
401 certification issued by Ecology only after determining the added
conditions are necessary to provide reasonable assurance water quality
standards will be met. The court also ruled that due deference should
be afforded the technical expertise of Ecology and the decisions made
within the scope of its expertise.
The Citizens Groups argued PCHB erred in considering studies,
reports and plans not submitted prior to Ecology's grant of the section
401 certification. The court held that PCHB did not err; explaining
that PCHB should review all relevant information regardless of submission date and PCHB's decisions need not be based on reasonable assurance at the time of the original certification.
The Citizens Groups also argued that Ecology and PCHB erred in
concluding there was reasonable assurance that the third runway project does not violate state water quality standards. Specifically, they
objected to the conditions imposed by PCHB, PCHB's reliance on future submissions, future National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits, and adaptive management. The court ruled
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that PCHB is within its authority to impose conditions it deems necessary to satisfy reasonable assurance and does not have to remand to
Ecology any section 401 certification it finds insufficient. Next, the
Citizens Groups argued PCHB cannot base its finding of reasonable
assurance on plans, studies, and reports unless they have already been
received and evaluated. However, the court concluded that Ecology
and PCHB did not act in an arbitrary or capricious way in their reliance on future revisions to the Port's plans, studies, and reports to find
reasonable assurance. Further, the court ruled that Ecology and PCHB
may rely on these sources as long as their information and execution
meet the same reasonable assurance standard.
The Citizens Groups further objected to PCHB's reliance on future
NPDES permits to guarantee compliance with state water quality standards, arguing that the NPDES permits are less protective than a section 401 certification. The NPDES permits are subject to provisions
prohibiting them from creating a lower standard with each subsequent
grant and PCHB explicitly stated that conditions of the section 401
certification, if not incorporated into new NPDES permits, will remain
effective as a part of the section 401 certification. The court found
these protections sufficient to justify reliance on the future NPDES
permits to ensure compliance with water quality standards. Next, the
Citizens Groups argued that reliance on future monitoring and adaptive management was fundamentally at odds with the reasonable assurance requirement. However, the court found the predictive nature of
the section 401 certification must necessarily rely on continued observation and Ecology and PCHB relied correctly on the provisions of
adaptive management and monitoring to find reasonable assurance.
For all of these reasons, the court held PCHB was justified in finding
there was reasonable assurance that the runway expansion project
would not violate water quality standards.
Regarding low flow mitigation, the court ruled on the adequacy of
the plan, the specific requirement contained in PCHB's condition six,
and the water right requirement of PCHB's condition sixteen. The
Citizens Groups took issue with the Port's plan to use stormwater to
mitigate low flows and with the section 401 certification's failure to
require the mitigation to begin before construction impacts flow.
However, the Citizens Groups did not introduce adequate evidence to
prove either of these arguments, so the court assigned no error to
PCHB based on its conclusion that the Port's plan for low flow mitigation was satisfactory.
The Port objected to PCHB's condition six which required the Port
to maintain a specified low flow level in Des Moines Creek, rather than
merely offset its runway expansion's impact on the stream. The court
ruled that PCHB erred in assigning this responsibility to the Port and
overturned condition six. Condition sixteen, imposed by PCHB, and
required the Port to obtain a water right in order to implement its low
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flow mitigation plan. Because the low flow mitigation project did not
propose to use or appropriate water, but merely to maintain existing
flow levels, the court ruled that it was not a beneficial use project, but a
stormwater management project. Since stormwater management does
not require a water right, the court overruled the requirement of condition sixteen.
Both the Port and the Citizens Groups attacked the fill criteria
PCHB imposed in condition seven. Additionally, the Port and Ecology
objected to PCHB's condition eight prohibiting the use of Synthetic
Precipitation Leaching Procedure ("SPLP") to evaluate fill, while the
Citizens Groups attacked the retroactive nature and constitutionality of
legislative approval of SPLP. Due to the Citizens Groups' lack of evidence supporting a need for PCHB to set stricter fill criteria based on
natural soil background levels, which was unnecessarily stringent in the
Port's view, the court overruled the criteria of PCHB's condition seven
but required Ecology to recalculate criteria for selenium and silver and
to set total petroleum hydrocarbons at zero. Regarding SPLP, the
court ruled that the legislature intended the statute governing the use
of SPLP to ensure the suitability of the fill and its effects on water quality to apply retroactively. The court further ruled that retroactive application is appropriate in this case, does not violate separation of
powers, and the Citizens Groups did not prove the statute amounted to
unconstitutional special legislation. The court also found no evidence
to suggest that SPLP conflicts with the Clean Water Act. The court
overruled condition eight prohibiting the use of SPLP, but required
Ecology to compare the SPLP results with both surface and groundwater criteria.
Construction of the third runway will necessarily disturb sediment,
causing temporary turbidity within a "mixing zone." The Citizens
Groups opposed the mixing zone provision of the section 401 certifica-

tion and argued that the Port's mere submission of a monitoring plan,
as opposed to a complete description of the effects of the mixing zone,
is insufficient to provide reasonable assurance. The court held that the
Citizens Groups did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the mixing zone provisions of the section 401 certification would result
in violation of water quality standards.
Both Port and Ecology opposed PCHB's condition five to the section 401 certification, which stated Water Effects Ratio ("WER") studies
would only be used to adjust for a stricter water quality standard. Both
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and Ecology approved
the WER for determining site specific criteria for water quality, and

both agencies allowed for adjustments as needed based on the results.
The court overturned condition number five and held that WER studies could apply to either tighten or relax water quality standards. Further, the court held that condition five contradicts a former statute and
PCHB provided no rational basis for ignoring the rule in this case.
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The court also held that since another, uncontested condition requires
upstream and downstream sampling, using WER studies only to tighten
restrictions is unjustified.
The Port proposed the restoration of Vacca Farm, a wetland used
for farming and grazing, to its historic peat wetland condition. Ecology found that Vacca Farm was degraded enough to qualify for restoration. The Citizens Groups contended that PCHB and Ecology wrongly
categorized the work at Vacca Farm as restoration instead of enhancement and accordingly granted the Port too much credit for their activities at the Vacca Farm site. Since the Citizens Groups did not show
that Ecology's opinion was flawed, the court deferred to Ecology's assessment and held that a site does not have to be entirely functionless
to qualify for restoration; a degraded wetland can be restored.
The last sentence of PCHB's condition eleven urged the Port to
consider other in-basin mitigation sites to fulfill its obligation. The
Port claimed, and the court agreed, there was no evidence of legislative
intent to require in-basin mitigation opportunities to be exhausted
before the Port turned to out-of-basin possibilities. Based on this evidence, and since the Citizens Groups did not present convincing arguments regarding the prohibition of out-of-basin mitigation, the court
overruled the final sentence of condition eleven and found the Port's
plan for out-of-basin mitigation adequate.
The court also ruled on two evidentiary issues. First, the court
found that PCHB did not abuse its discretion when it redacted testimony regarding the political motivations that allegedly undercut the
section 401 certification. PCHB was entirely within its rights to exclude
irrelevant evidence. Second, the court held that PCHB did not need to
include inadvertently disclosed privileged opinions of the assistant attorney general because the lack of these opinions did not prejudice the
decision of PCHB against the Citizens Groups.
The court affirmed the ruling of PCHB regarding the reasonable
assurance of the Port's compliance with water quality standards, affirmed PCHB's conditions one through four, nine, ten, the first two
sentences of condition eleven, and conditions twelve through fifteen,
overturned conditions five through eight, the final sentence of condition eleven, and condition sixteen.
Meredith Ginn
WEST VIRGINIA
McCormick v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 600 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 2004) (reversing dismissal of the town as defendant because neither intervening
stormwater flow through private property nor statutory immunity prevented town liability for negligent operation of city drainage systems).
The McCormick family ("McCormick") filed suit against the Town
of Lewisburg ("Town"), Walmart Stores ("Walmart"), and Walmart's
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construction and engineering companies seeking damages for injuries
to McCormick's real property allegedly caused by negligent operation
of the Town's stormwater drainage systems. McCormick alleged that
the Town operated its drainage systems in a manner such that stormwater previously diverted elsewhere flowed across Walmart's property
and onto McCormick's property causing injury. The Circuit Court of
Greenbrier County granted a motion to dismiss the Town as a defendant on the grounds that McCormick's complaint failed to state a
claim against the Town for which the circuit court could grant relief.
McCormick appealed.
The Supreme Court of West Virginia first addressed the Town's
contention that because the stormwater from Town facilities first
flowed over Walmart's property before entering McCormick's property, the Town could not be liable. Citing Whorton v. Malone, the court
noted that a landowner could not claim immunity because of the subsequent path of stormwater through a third party's land before injury
occurred on the land of another.
The court next dismissed the Town's argument that because the
Town granted Walmart a permit to construct a store on Walmart's
property, West Virginia law granted the Town statutory immunity from
the suit. Section 29-12A-5(a) immunizes political subdivisions for
claims that arise due to the action of private parties who first obtain a
permit. However, the court noted McCormick was not attempting to
hold the Town liable for Walmart's actions. Specifically, McCormick
had alleged that the Town itself had been negligent in operating the
Town's own drainage systems, and therefore McCormick's claim was
The court thus found that McCornot precluded by § 29-12A-5(a).
mick had stated a claim against the Town for which the circuit court
could grant relief and accordingly reversed the circuit court. Chief Justice Maynard, in dissent, found no basis in case law for holding a nonadjacent landowner liable for water runoff injuries to another. The
dissent stated that case law only required that a landowner be reasonable in light of effects on adjacent landowners when diverting stormwater. Additionally, the dissent stated that because the court had never
recognized a duty of a landowner to alleviate stormwater problems
caused by the development of nearby land, the court should have affirmed the circuit court.
Matthew Sarles
WYOMING
In re The Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River Sys., 85 P.3d 981 (Wyo. 2003) (holding: (1) the district court
lacked jurisdiction to hear claim to the extent irrigators sought to enforce federal rights, (2) irrigators failed to preserve the right to bring
claim by not challenging reservoir certificate, (3) irrigators were not
entitled to reopen water rights certification confirmation process, (4)
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resjudicata barred the claims, (5) laches barred the claims, and (6) the
irrigators' due process rights were not violated).
John Max and Roberta Lee Stutzman ("the Stutzmans"), owners
and individual irrigators of Wyoming farmland, brought an action in
the Wyoming Supreme Court appealing the district court's dismissal of
their petition to intervene in the Big Horn River general adjudication
("Adjudication") claiming rights to water stored in the Buffalo Bill
Reservoir ("Reservoir").
The Stutzmans' farmland in Park County, Wyoming is located
within the Shoshone Reclamation Project ("Project"). The Project,
initiated in 1899, was a federal reclamation project constructed and
operated by the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902. As early settlers acquired Project land, they were
required to complete a water rights application, allowing them and
their heirs to use stored water in the Reservoir. The Reservoir was the
centerpiece of the Project and provided water for irrigation, power
generation, municipal supply, recreation, and other beneficial uses.
The Reservoir also provided water to four irrigation districts that supplied water to individual users like the Stutzmans through contracts.
In January 2001 the Stutzmans filed a petition to intervene in the
Adjudication because they were dissatisfied with the BOR's administration of the Reservoir's stored water. Alleging their predecessors acquired Project lands through water applications and patents, the
Stutzmans, as heirs, claimed implied secondary water rights from Reservoir permits and ownership of a proportionate share of water in the
Reservoir by virtue of federal land patents, water rights applications,
repayment contracts, and the Reclamation Act of 1902. They did not
allege denial of any specific amount of water to which they were entitled under these contracts, but rather raised the broader question of
who owned or controlled the water stored in the Project.
Both the United States and the State of Wyoming filed separate
motions to dismiss the petition. The district court granted these dismissals based on a lack of lacked jurisdiction over the claims after consideration of the federal patents, the Reclamation Act, and the doctrines of laches and res judicata. The Stutzmans' appeal arose out of
the continued Adjudication, first initiated in 1977. Primarily, the Adjudication determined what water rights the federal government reserved for the Wind River Indian Reservation's benefit, but the Adjudication consisted of three phases. The Stutzmans' case fell under Phase
III litigation, which addressed adjudication of all state water rights evidenced by a permit or certificate.
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of jurisdiction. The court concluded that at least four entities held
rights to Project water, including the federal government, the state, the
district, and the end user. The Stutzmans' alleged rights to a share of
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the stored water involved both the state and the federal government.
While the district court retained jurisdiction over their state property
rights, the court could not enforce their rights against the United
States pursuant to federal patents and contracts. Therefore, the court
held the district court properly found it lacked jurisdiction over the
Stutzmans' claims to the extent that they sought to enforce federal
contracts and ruled that the district court could determine the state
claims.
Examining these state claims, the court next addressed the question of whether the Stutzmans failed to preserve their right to bring a
claim by not challenging the Reservoir certificates. The Stutzmans
sought a declaratory judgment in the district court for their implied
secondary water rights after failing to obtain a secondary reservoir
permit from the BOR, their irrigation district, and the State Engineer.
The district court held the Stutzmans' failure to challenge the reservoir
certificates within the time limit set out in Phase III litigation procedures barred their claims by laches and res judicata. The court concluded the district court correctly found the Stutzmans' claims were
untimely and barred by looking at the nature and scope of their water
rights claims.
The Stutzmans based their claim for an implied secondary water
right upon Condict v. Ryan and Wyoming common law. They argued
the right had not yet been adjudicated, because only the right to store
water under the permits had been adjudicated in 1963 and then confirmed in 1985. They contended their implied secondary right gave
them, not the BOR, the power to control their share of stored water
based on: (1) reservoir permit conditions stating the intent of stored
water was for irrigation of lands, including theirs, (2) patents issued to
the land with the right to use the water for the Project, (3) the specific
share of water allotted via the water rights applications required of
their predecessors, and (4) the repayment contract between the
United States and the Shoshone Irrigation District. The court looked
again at the principles established in Condict to determine the nature
of the Stutzmans' claim and held the Stutzmans failed to preserve their
right to bring a claim by not challenging the reservoir certificates.
Also on appeal, the court addressed whether the Stutzmans had the
ability to challenge the issuance of their water rights certificate to the
BOR. Both the State of Wyoming and the United States contended the
reservoir permits were fully adjudicated in 1963 and the applicable
statutes barred the Stutzmans from filing late claims. The court determined the legislature designed the water rights statutes intending
fully adjudicated certificates to be final and complete statements of the
holder's rights. In addition, Phase III procedures allowed the Stutzmans to challenge the confirmation of their previously adjudicated
permit by 1985. They could have also filed an application for a secondary permit by the deadline. The Stutzmans argued neither action was

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 8

necessary because their rights already vested and they were not required to challenge or seek additional permits. The district court held
it was unwilling to set aside years of progress in the general adjudication to consider the Stutzmans' petition and, instead, needed to conform to its scheduling order and move forward. Thus, the court also
held the Stutzmans were not entitled to reopen the water rights certification confirmation process by failure to challenge their certificate at
the appropriate time.
To address the district court's ruling that res judicata barred the
Stutzmans' claims, the court looked at four factors: identity in parties,
identity in subject matter, similar issues relating to the subject matter,
and whether the capacities of the persons were identical in reference
to both the subject matter and the issues between them. The court
held that while the subject matter and issues involved in the Stutzmans'
claims were different from those actually litigated in the adjudication
of the reservoir permits, such issues could have been raised, and all
other elements of res judicata were present. Since res judicata applies
to issues that should have been litigated, the court found the Stutzmans had ample time to raise their claims and since they did not, res
judicata rightfully barred their claims.
The district court also held the doctrine of laches barred the
Stutzmans' claims. The court noted a claim of laches is comprised of
two elements, inexcusable delay and injury and prejudice to an opposing party or others. The court determined the Stutzmans' delay to
make claims in 1963 or 1985 was clearly inexcusable. The court found
the nature of water rights and the limited nature of the resource itself
presumed prejudice to others competing for water on the Big Horn
River system and, thus, laches applied. The Stutzmans argued their
case involved legal title and therefore making a laches analysis inapplicable. However, the court stated that under Wyoming law, water users
do not own the water. Water users, like the Stutzmans, are only
granted rights to its use; therefore, this case did not involve title.
Therefore, the court held laches properly barred the Stutzmans'
claims.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the district court
violated the Stutzmans' right to due process when it dismissed their
petition to intervene. The district court's dismissal did not bar the
Stutzmans from all rights to use the stored water. The court held no
right existed for them to have their claim to a state water right decided
in the general adjudication. Their irrigation flow rights confirmed by
the Irrigation District had not changed nor had their ability to make
claims in federal court. In addition, the due process clauses of the
United States and Wyoming Constitutions protect citizens against deprivation of property without due process of law. The Stutzmans had
the burden to show the court affected their property interest in an impermissible way. However, the Stutzmans did not satisfy the burden of
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proof, based on their benefit from both the proper procedures for notice and opportunity to object. Therefore, the court held the district
court did not violate the Stutzmans' due process rights.
In conclusion, the Wyoming Supreme Court held the district court
properly exercised its long established procedures to bring finality and
certainty to an extended, expensive, and complicated judicial effort,
and affirmed the decision of the district court. However, the Stutzmans were not limited in pursuing their contract rights against the
BOR.
JuliaHerron

